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THERE IS NO SUCH TING AS TEXTUALISM:




Textualism is constitutional law's Loch Ness Monster. Like Old
Nessie, many people claim that textualism exists, some even claim to
have seen it themselves. Also, believers in both myths offer sketchy
evidence to support their claims. Just as we have grainy pictures of
something that could be the fabled sea beast, we have even sketchier
theories claiming that meaning resides in the Constitution's text. And
in the end, both beliefs are nothing more than a good story passed
down from one generation to the next.
Sadly, the similarity ends there. While accounts of the Loch Ness
Monster are relegated to notorious scandal sheets like The National
Enquirer and The Star, accounts of textualism appear in the pages of
respected publications such as the United States Reports and elite law
reviews. While a professed belief in the Scottish monster can lead to
ridicule and a bed in an asylum, belief in textualism can bring
professional respect and even a seat on the Supreme Court. Why this
difference? While we all know deep down that there is no such thing
as the Loch Ness Monster, we just cannot bring ourselves to accept
that there is no such thing as textualism. This difference should
bother us. For, while the tale of Old Nessie is a harmless fable that
entertains, textualism is a legal tool used to decide questions of life,
liberty, and property.'
* Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law <pmcgreal@stcl.edu>. Many
thanks to Hans Baade, Sandy Levinson, and Jim Paulsen for helpful conversations on
prior drafts of this Article. I also benefited greatly from comments on a presentation
of the Article at the Constitutional Studies Colloquium at the University of Texas
School of Law. And, special thanks to Bruce Burton, who once again read and
discussed multiple drafts of my writing. His keen insights, intellectual enthusiasm,
and consummate collegiality make the writing process a joy. Of course, all miscues,
missteps, and mistakes that remain are mine.
1. See generally Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial
Process (1975); Robert M. Cover, The Suprene Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos
and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983); Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to
Go, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 167, 187 (1990) (stating that the emptiness of normative legal
thought "can seem very funny. That's because it is very funny. It is also deadly
serious. It is deadly serious, because all this normative legal thought, as Robert Cover
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This Article searches for the mythical textualist monster, hoping to
expose it for the fraud it is. To do so, however, we need to get past
current ways of thinking about constitutional method. Typically,
explorations of textualism, or any other interpretive method (like
original intent), take one of two approaches. First, some authors
discuss textualism "in theory" or "in the abstract," seeking the
objective foundation or essence of that method. Once found, that
foundation or essence both defines textualism and justifies its use.
Second, some authors critique how other authors use textualism.
These critiques claim either that someone used textualism incorrectly,
or that textualism should not have been used at all. Both approaches
share the same perspective: an interpretive method is an object that
we can examine and compare to a rational, ideal form. Just as one
might assess a diamond based on the four "c's" of clarity, cut, carat,
and color, one can assess textualism, or the use of textualism, based on
its textbook definition.
The dominant approaches misunderstand the nature of interpretive
methods. Interpretive methods are practices-they are activities that
lawyers engage in, not objects that lawyers talk about. Lawyers "do
not learn the forms of argument by studying them as forms, but by
legal practice; they do not presuppose mental entities to which they
conform and which can be handed over to the student."2
Consequently, we learn little if anything useful about the methods by
analyzing them "in theory" or "in the abstract," as many
commentators do. We need a new approach.
A new approach would treat interpretive methods as something
lawyers do. Put simply, we learn about the methods only through
actually using them. To offer yet another analogy, one cannot get a
feel for how a car handles by reading the owner's manual or watching
someone else drive it. Rather, one needs to get behind the wheel and
put it through its paces. Similarly, we need to see textualism in
action-take it out for a spin and see how it handles.
There is only one way to take a constitutional method out for a test
drive: use it to analyze a constitutional question. This Article takes
that approach. Instead of discussing textualism in theory or critiquing
a judge's use of textualism, I propose a constitutional case study that
allows me, and the reader, to put textualism to use. Then, as I am
making constitutional arguments and engaging in the practice of
constitutional interpretation, I hope, through a sideways glance, to
learn something about how the constitutional methods work. Riding
along on this case study, I hope the reader might get a glimpse of what
I see from the driver's seat: there is no such thing as textualism.
explained, takes place in a field of pain and death.").
2. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 179 (1991) [hereinafter Bobbitt,
Interpretation].
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The case study discusses a little-remembered provision of the
congressional joint resolution admitting Texas to the Union. In that
provision, Congress authorized the Texas legislature to divide the
state into as many as five states by creating four new states within its
limits.3  Each new state would be automatically admitted into the
Union, with no additional congressional action required. Imagine
that-five Texases!4  Eight additional senators and electoral votes.
Four more stars on the flag. And all if the Texas legislature gets the
itch to do so.
But, would this be constitutional? It seems just plain weird for a
state to spontaneously divide, as if it were a political amoeba. While
weirdness is not a constitutional standard, it should at least cause us to
ask questions.' The answers depend on how one interprets the
Constitution's Statehood Clause:
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no
new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any
other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more
States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of
the States concerned as ivell as of the Congress.6
The Texas five-state provision raises three interpretive questions.
First, does the Clause allow division of an existing state? The middle
part of the Clause provides, "no new State shall be formed or erected
within the Jurisdiction of any other State," which suggests that no
division is allowed. But, the last part of the Clause, italicized above,
allows certain actions with the consent of Congress and the states
involved. The interpretive question is whether the consent provision
leaps back across the second semi-colon to allow division of a state
with proper consent.
Second, if states can be divided, can Congress "consent" to division
in the same legislative act that admits the state into the Union? The
Statehood Clause speaks of creating new states "within the
Jurisdiction of any other State." Until Congress approved the
resolution admitting Texas into the Union, Texas was not yet "any
other State" that could be divided.7 So, we must determine whether
3. Joint Resolution for Annexing Texas to the United States, 28th Cong., 2d
Sess., 5 Stat. 797, 798 (1845) ("New States, of convenient size, not exceeding four in
number, in addition to said State of Texas, and having sufficient population, may
hereafter, by the consent of said State, be formed out of the territory thereof, which
shall be entitled to admission under the provisions of the federal constitution.").
4. Of course, deciding which of the five states would retain the cherished
designation "Texas," along with the iconic Lone Star flag, would set off a political
battle royale that would make the Clinton impeachment seem like a bipartisan picnic.
5. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (noting that state's action was
"unprecedented in our jurisprudence" and that this was a reason to raise
constitutional concerns).
6. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3 (emphasis added).
7. Some argue that admission of Texas itself was unconstitutional because it was
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Congress could simultaneously create a state and consent to its
division.
Third, is there any time limit within which Congress and a state
must consent to division? Congress passed the five-state provision in
1845. One hundred fifty-six years later, however, the Texas legislature
has yet to consent to the division. Is it too late for Texas to do so? Is
there some statute of limitations on consent? If so, the five-state
provision will have lapsed into history.
Needless to say, these three questions are not ripe for judicial
review. The Texas legislature has never come close to dividing the
state,8 and I know of no current political lobby pushing the issue. For
that very reason, the five-state provision makes an attractive case
study. The typical case study involves a question with either an
obvious answer or immediate political consequences. 9 Either type of
question distorts the ultimate analysis. If the answer is obvious, the
author's "conclusion" is pre-determined and her analysis is just "going
through the motions." If the question is politically charged,
unacknowledged ideological influences will be more likely to push the
analysis one way or the other, distorting our view of the interpretive
methods in action. The five-state provision case study avoids these
problems. Because no one presently has a personal or political stake
in the five-state provision, and the answer is not obvious, we may
pursue the methods with an unbiased view.
done by joint resolution instead of by treaty. For a discussion of this and other issues
surrounding Texas statehood, see James W. Paulsen, If at First You Don't Secede: Ten
Reasons Why the "Republic of Texas" Movement is Wrong, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 801,
803-07 (1997); and Ralph H. Brock, "The Republic of Texas Is No More". An Answer
to the Claim that Texas Was Unconstitutionally Annexed to the United States, 28 Tex.
Tech L. Rev. 679,724-34 (1997).
8. The only serious attempt to divide the state took place at the special
convention called to draft a Reconstruction constitution for Texas. See generally
Ernest Wallace, The Howling of the Coyotes: Reconstruction Efforts to Divide Texas
(1979). While the convention sent a single constitution to Congress, a rogue faction
of delegates also presented Congress with a constitution for a separate State of West
Texas. Id. at 91-108. Congress ultimately opted for an undivided Texas, sending a
single state constitution back for ratification. Id. at 124. On ante-bellum agitation for
division, see id. at 3-15; on post-Reconstruction agitation for division, see id. at 137-
46.
9. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the Purported
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 11 Const. Comment. 101, 102-03 (1994) (analyzing the
constitutionality of ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, which dealt with
the political hot potato of congressional pay raises); Jordan Steiker et al., Taking Text
and Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of
Presidential Eligibility, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 237, 238-52 (1995) (analyzing whether any
Presidents other than John Adams, John Quincy Adams, and Zachary Taylor were
constitutionally eligible to hold the office). These studies often make the point that
constitutional methods are manipulable, either because the methods can support
counterintuitive results, or because all sides of a political controversy can invoke
them. Some authors go further to examine the canons of constitutional law. J. M.
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev.
963, 1002-21 (1998).
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Parts I and II compose the
case study on the Texas five-state provision. Part I sketches the
historical context of the five-state provision, placing it within the saga
of Texas annexation. Part II then analyzes the three constitutional
questions raised by the five-state provision, using the accepted
methods of text, history, structure, past government practice, and
judicial precedent.10 While this Article focuses on textualism, the case
study must use all the methods of constitutional interpretation
because textualism reveals its true nature only when used alongside
the other methods of interpretation."
Part III then draws two main lessons about constitutional method
from the case study." First, as the title states, there is no such thing as
textualism. While text may appear to play some role in interpretation,
it merely masks the role of other forces at work. Second, the
textualist myth has misled constitutional theorists to classify clauses of
the Constitution as "vague and ambiguous" or "relatively specific,"
and then offer different approaches to interpreting each type of
clause. After dispelling the textualist myth, we will see that
supposedly "vague and ambiguous" clauses may indeed have specific
10. I use these methods because, for the most part, they currently constitute our
practice of constitutional interpretation, not because of some foundationalist belief
that these methods are correct or proper. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate:
Theory of the Constitution 5-6 (1982) ("[A]rguments are conventions.... they could
be different,... but then we would be different.") [hereinafter Bobbitt, Fate];
Bobbitt, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 6-22. My commitment to these particular
methods, then, is descriptive, not normative.
11. Some commentators refer to this as a coherence approach to interpretation,
whereby an interpreter compares the analysis under each method and seeks
coherence among the various methods. See J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal
Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 Yale L.J.
105, 123-24 (1993) (describing such an approach under the label of -rational
reconstruction"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constrnctivist Coherence Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1240 (1987) (labeling this
approach as the constructivist coherence theory of constitutional interpretation).
Professor Richard Fallon describes the practice of coherence as follows:
The implicit norms of our practice of constitutional interpretation
prescribe an effort to achieve plausible understandings of arguments
from text, the framers' intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and
relevant values, all of which point to the same result. A provisional
conclusion may be reached as to the balance of argument within each
factor; perhaps more commonly, the decisionmaking process will have a
gestalt-like quality, in which each category is considered with all of the
others in mind. But if the conclusions fail to cohere into a uniform
prescription for how the case or issue ought to be resolved, then any or
all of the individual conclusions may be reexamined, and the results
adjusted insofar as plausible within the prevailing conventions of
constitutional analysis, in an effort to achieve a uniform outcome.
Id
12. Part III also reviews three other lessons from the case study, but those lessons
are really byproducts of the overall focus of the project, which is to learn something
about textualism. Thus, while this Article does not ignore those secondary lessons,
neither does it focus on them.
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meaning, while "relatively specific" clauses may raise difficult
constitutional questions. This should not be surprising, given that text
does little if any interpretive work in constitutional law.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FIVE-STATE PROVISION
The battle over Texas annexation was in part a struggle to avoid
two wars as well as to save a political party.13  First, given the
contentious relationship between Mexico and the Republic of Texas,
annexation was thought to entail war with Mexico. 4  Second,
annexation was so fraught with sectional controversy that merely
debating the issue might push the United States closer to civil war.'
5
As we know today, both premonitions were correct-annexation both
precipitated the Mexican-American War and continued the trajectory
toward the Civil War. Third, the annexation issue helped destroy the
Whig Party by exacerbating sectional divisions. 16 Together, these
three factors help explain why Congress included the five-state
provision in the Texas statehood resolution, which will be clarified by
analyzing each factor in turn.
Few people wanted war with Mexico. If the United States was to go
to war, there had to be something significant to gain. Since
annexation of Texas would likely result in war with Mexico, the first
hurdle for annexationists was to prove that something important hung
in the balance. Through the early 1840s, neither major political party
saw any great advantage in annexing Texas. 7 In addition to likely
war, annexation would open sectional rifts within both the Democrat
and Whig Parties. 8 These reasons were sufficient to keep annexation
a non-issue in the 1834 and 1840 presidential elections. And, as the
1844 presidential election approached, the issue did not seem destined
for either party's agenda.
Slave politics and an exiled sitting president helped overcome the
inertia against Texas annexation. Then-President John Tyler had
come to office in a unique way. In 1840, he was elected the Vice
President to war hero General William Henry Harrison, who swept
the Whigs to their first presidential victory, as well as to convincing
13. The following account of Texas Annexation draws heavily upon the
discussions in William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay,
1776-1854, at 353-71 (1990); and Michael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American
Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War 112-224 (1999).
14. Freehling, supra note 13, at 355.
15. Id. ("Before Texas, tendencies towards secession were merely foreshadowed.
After annexation, events would come in a rush.").
16. Holt, supra note 13, at 954.
17. Id. at 171-72.
18. Id. at 168 ("Texas annexation, involved the sectionally divisive question of
slavery expansion, a dispute with ominous potential to divide both the Whig and
Democratic parties along sectional lines.").
[Vol. 692398
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victories in the House and the Senate. 9 Harrison had promised to be
a hands-off president who would defer to the Whigs in Congress." So,
Whig legislators anticipated enacting a sweeping domestic legislative
agenda, which included a strengthened national banking system,
tariffs, and federally-funded internal improvements3'
Before the Whig Congress ever got going, their war-hero president
died. For the first time in United States history, the Vice President
succeeded to the presidency. Shortly thereafter, the Whigs learned
that President Tyler, known derisively as "His Accidency," did not
support most of his party's legislative agenda." Consequently, the
ensuing years of the Tyler Administration saw many battles between
the President and his party in Congress. After a string of vetoes that
gutted their legislative agenda, the Whigs tossed Tyler out of the
party.' Tyler was a President without a party.
As the end of his term approached, Tyler feared that his presidency
had consisted mostly of vetoing legislation. Without prominent
positive accomplishments, he feared for both his legacy and his
chances of re-election. Texas annexation seemed the perfect issue to
address both concerns.24 On the legacy side, Tyler would be known as
the president who pushed United States expansion further into the
southwest. On the re-election side, Tyler would use annexation to
split the Democrat and Whig parties along sectional lines, riding a
new Southern alliance to an electoral victory.'
Texas annexation proved such a divisive issue because many saw it
as central to the question of whether slavery would ever be abolished.
In the South,26 some saw annexation as the only way to preserve
slavery. To reject annexation was to place the South on a slippery
slope to abolition and thus anarchy. The logic, while perhaps a bit
paranoid, rested on two core beliefs: the Republic of Texas needed to
settle its hostilities with Mexico, and England wished to spread
abolition throughout the world. A series of diplomatic signals from
England and Texas, some misperceived, some not, led several
southern leaders to believe that England would take advantage of
19. Id. at 112-13.
20. Id. at 122 ("Harrison had repeatedly pledged to defer to the will of Congress,
and Whigs intended to prove that congressional initiative could work.").
21. Id. at 122-23, 128.
22. Id at 128.
23. Freehling, supra note 13, at 364; Holt, supra note 13, at 128-50.
24. Holt, supra note 13, at 170-71, 982.
25. Id. at 170.
26. In this brief account, I repeatedly make the unforgivable historical sin of
referring to a single South, as if all Americans below a specified latitude shared the
same beliefs and world view. See Freehling, supra note 13, at viii ('\Vhenever
someone declaims on a South,... ask them which South is meant, and when?"(emphasis in original)). I do so to simplify the account of Texas annexation to only
those matters necessary for the legal analysis that follows. Thus, historians would
rightly criticize me for doing lawyer's history.
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Texas' situation to push abolition into the United States. England
would offer Texas military protection from Mexico in exchange for
abolition of slavery. Once abolition gained a foothold in Texas, it
would somehow spread to the United States, devastating the South.27
While southern leaders were not always clear how precisely this would
happen, their fear was real enough to spur them to action, and Tyler
knew it.2
Tyler ultimately got the legacy but not the re-election. After he
signed a treaty of annexation with Texas, the Democrats saw the
political possibilities in annexation and nominated James Polk, a pro-
Texas southerner, as their presidential standard-bearer.29 With the
Democratic party now pro-annexation, the South had no need for a
Tyler-led third party."0 But, with his legacy still at stake, Tyler
continued to work for annexation. He submitted the treaty to
Congress, where the Whigs continued to oppose annexation.31 Thus,
going into the 1844 presidential election, the two major parties stood
on opposite sides of the day's main issue.
Here enters the third factor behind the five-state provision:
problems within the Whig Party. During the 1844 presidential
campaign, with Henry Clay as their candidate, the Whigs believed that
economic issues, such as banking, tariffs, and internal improvements,
would be the main battleground.32 Consequently, Clay felt free to
voice his opposition to immediate annexation of Texas.33 This
position ultimately proved unpopular in the South, contributing to
Clay's narrow defeat even in southern states where Harrison, the 1840
Whig candidate, had run strong.34 Clay's campaign had stung the
Whigs with the harsh label "anti-Texas."
At that time, not all federal elections were held on the same day. In
1844, states held their elections for presidential electors throughout
the fall. In many states, however, elections for the House and Senate
were not held until 1845.31 Thus, many Whig representatives and
27. Id. at 388-98.
28. Id. at 398-401.
29. Id. at 430-31.
30. Id. at 433 ("Polk's nomination made Tyler's race both counterproductive
(because annexationist votes would be split) and unwinnable (because the regular
party candidate running on the same issue had too great an advantage).").
31. Id. at 431-33.
32. Holt, supra note 13, at 171-87.
33. Freehling, supra note 13, at 426-28, 435-37; Holt, supra note 13, at 177-87;
Robert V. Remini, Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union 640 (1991) (on his anti-
Texas stance, Clay "stated that he felt perfectly confident about the ground he had
taken and had no fear of the consequences because he knew that Van Buren, the
likely Democratic candidate, also opposed annexation").
34. Freehling, supra note 13, at 437-39; Holt, supra note 13, at 199-200; Remini,
supra note 33, at 646-47 (by nominating Polk, "with a single stroke, the Democrats
had virtually annihilated Clay in the South and in every other place where
expansionism was the dominant issue" (citation omitted)).
35. At that time, state legislatures chose the senators, and many states did not
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senators had time to learn from Clay's mistakes. Specifically, some
southern Whigs felt the need to take a strong pro-Texas stance,b yet,
to make gains on the Democrats these Whigs had to appear more
stridently pro-Texas than the Democrats. For this reason,
Representative Milton Brown, Whig of Tennessee, proposed that
Texas be allowed to divide itself into as many as five states." Where
Democrats offered a single slave Texas, southern Whigs offered as
many as five. Where Democrats offered two additional slave senators,
southern Whigs offered the potential for ten. The five-state provision
was calculated to prove the southern Whigs' bona fides on Texas and
thus on slavery.38
Congress could not agree on all aspects of Texas annexation,
including the five-state provision, yet, a majority at least agreed that
annexation was desirable. So, Congress passed a joint resolution that
authorized the President to decide whether to negotiate with Texas
over terms of annexation, or to offer Texas annexation as a slave state
that could divide into as many as five slave states.39 President Tyler
chose the latter option, and offered Texas annexation as a slave state
along with the five-state provision.' Texas accepted the offer," and
Congress later confirmed Texas' admission to the Union4 2
II. THE LONE STAR STATES?: A CASE STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL METHOD
The Texas five-state provision raises three constitutional questions.
First, does the Constitution allow division of an existing state into two
or more states? Second, may Congress admit a state into the Union
and consent to its future division in the same legislative act? Third, is
there a time limit on dividing a state? The next three sections address
these questions.
A. Division of an Existing State
Article IV, section 3 addresses admission of new states into the
Union:
elect their new legislatures until 1845. Holt, supra note 13, at 218.
36. d at 218-20.
37. Freehling, supra note 13, at 440 ("A few Southern Whigs sought to reverse
electoral defeats they had suffered from being labeled soft on Texas. They would
enable Texas, once admitted to the Union, to balloon into five slave states."); Holt,
supra note 13, at 220.
38. For the mixed results of this Whig strategy, see Holt, supra note 13, at 222-24.
39. SJ. Res. 8, 28th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 Stat. 797 (Mar. 1, 1845); Freehling, supra
note 13, at 447-48.
40. Freehling, supra note 13, at 448-49.
41. Joint Resolution Giving the Consent of the Existing Government to the
Annexation of Texas to the United States, 9th Cong., Extra Sess., 1, 3 (1845),
available at http://www.yale.edu/Ilavweb/avalon/texan02.htm.
42. H.RJ. Res. 1, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 Stat. 108 (Dec. 29, 1845).
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[1] New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; [2]
but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction
of any other State; [3] nor any State be formed by the Junction of
two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.43
The bracketed numbers divide the Statehood Clause into three parts,
using the semi-colons as dividers. Part 1 grants Congress power to
admit new states; part 2 generally prohibits the division of a state into
two or more states; and part 3 generally prohibits the consolidation of
two or more states or parts of states. For current purposes, the main
interpretative puzzle lies in the italicized portion of part 3. Plainly,
the italicized language allows consolidation of two or more states, or
parts of states, upon consent of Congress and the state legislatures.
The question is whether this consent provision also applies to part 2's
prohibition against dividing an existing state. If so, the Statehood
Clause would allow division of an existing state upon consent of
Congress and the state to be divided. If not, the Clause bars division
of an existing state regardless of the circumstances. The following
sections examine text, history, structure, precedent, and past
government practice for an answer to our first question.
1. Text
In the eyes of the strict grammarian, part 3's consent provision does
not reach into part 2. To see this, consider the nature and function of
the punctuation mark separating parts 2 and 3: the semi-colon. A
semi-colon generally links two independent clauses.' Independent
clauses are grammatically complete in themselves-they contain a
subject and verb and do not need additional language to make sense.45
While related, the independent clauses on either side of a semi-colon
each express a complete thought. Consequently, modifiers or
dependent clauses within an independent clause do not modify a
separate, linked independent clause on the other side of the semi-
colon.
Under common grammatical rules, all three parts of the Statehood
Clause are independent clauses. Each part expresses a complete idea
and, while related to the other parts, does not modify the others. Our
strict grammarian would read parts 2 and 3 separately, confining the
consent provision to part 3. Thus, part 2 prohibits division of a state
regardless of whether Congress and the state consent.4 6
43. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3 (emphasis added).
44. Merriam-Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2063 (1986) (defining
a semi-colon: "used to separate independent clauses when the clauses are joined by
no connective").
45. Patricia T. O'Conner, Woe Is I: The Grammarphobe's Guide to Better
English in Plain English 206 (1996).
46. As Professor Hans Baade graciously brought to my attention, no discussion of
[Vol. 692402
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While this might be the best grammatical reading of the Statehood
Clause, it need not be the best interpretation of the Constitution. In
interpreting the Constitution, we look to rules of grammar because
those rules describe how people generally use language. The
Constitution is an instance of language in use and therefore it makes
sense to presume that the drafters and ratifiers, as users of language
themselves, knew of and used the grammar rules in drafting and
understanding that document.47  Grammar rules are descriptive,"
however, and the presumption in favor of those rules must yield to
evidence that better describes how the Constitution uses language. 9
Later sections explore other evidence, such as history, structure, past
government practice, and judicial precedent.
Grammar rules are not the only aspect of textual interpretation.
An alternative method is to examine other portions of the
Constitution to determine how the drafters used language in other
instances. One commentator has termed this method
"intratextualism."5 While grammar rules attempt to describe how an
entire community uses language, intratextualism asks only how the
people who drafted and ratified the Constitution used language. The
idea is that the framers and ratifiers may have used language in a
semi-colons in the context of Texas would be complete without reference to the
infamous "Semi-colon Court," which decided a case with a striking parallel to the
interpretive issue under consideration. Ex Parte Rodriguez, 39 Tex. 705 (1873); see
James R. Norvell, The Reconstruction Courts of Texas, 62 Sw. Hist. Q. 141, 155-63
(1958) (discussing political history of the case, where the Reconstruction Supreme
Court of Texas invalidated a state election by relying on a grammatical reading of the
state constitution). In Rodriguez, the Texas Supreme Court interpreted a provision of
the state constitution that provided: "All elections for state, district, and county
officers shall be held at the county seats of the several counties, until otherwise
provided by law; and the polls shall be opened for four days, from 8 o'clock A.M. until
4 o'clock P.M. of each day." Rodriguez, 39 Tex. at 705-06 (quoting Texas Constitution
of 1869, art. 3, § 6) (emphasis added). The Texas Legislature had provided that all
state elections should take place on a single day. Id. at 773. The question was whether
the Texas Constitution required the polls to be open for four days, or whether the
Texas Legislature could provide "otherwise... by law." The answer depended on
whether the language "until otherwise provided by law" jumped forward over the
semi-colon and modified the clause regarding the time of elections. Like the modem
grammarian described above, the Texas Supreme Court treated the semi-colon as
terminal punctuation, limiting the italicized language (and thus the Texas
Legislature's power over state elections) to the first independent clause regarding the
place of state elections. Id. at 774.
47. See Peter Jeremy Smith, Conmmas, Constitutional Grammar, and the Straight-
Face Test What if Conan the Grammarian Were a Strict Textualist?, 16 Const.
Comment. 7, 17 (1999) ("Any principled approach to textual construction, of course,
must presuppose, at least to some extent, normative rules of grammar and syntax.").
48. See Steven Pinker, The Language Instinct 370 (1994) ("To a linguist or
psycholinguist, of course... [tihe way to determine whether a construction is
'grammatical' is to find people who speak the language and ask them.").
49. Smith, supra note 47, at 31; see Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41, 54
(1837).
50. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L Rev. 747,747 (1999).
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different manner than that dictated by the rules of grammar and
usage.5 1 This personal usage can be gleaned from examining how they
used language throughout the Constitution. 2
For our question, we need to examine some other portion of the
Constitution to help shed light on whether the consent provision in
part 3 of the Statehood Clause applies to part 2 of the Clause. The
third clause in Article I, section 10 offers a possible candidate:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
Several aspects of this clause are relevant to our interpretation of the
Statehood Clause. Like the Statehood Clause, this clause lists actions
that are prohibited. Also, like the Statehood Clause, this clause
allows certain actions upon "consent" of a specified body. But, there
is a crucial difference between the two clauses: the above-quoted
clause places both the prohibition ("No State shall") and the
allowance for consent ("without the Consent of Congress") at the
beginning of the listed items. This structure indicates that the
prohibition and consent apply to all of the items that follow.
Additionally, the listed items are separated by commas, not semi-
colons, indicating that all items are part of the same provision. Under
the rules of grammar, this clause is a straightforward statement that all
the listed items are prohibited unless Congress consents.
Now, compare the text of the Statehood Clause:
[1] New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; [2]
but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction
of any other State; [3] nor any State be formed by the Junction of
two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. 54
Placing the consent provision at the end of the Clause seems like a
roundabout way to cover the prohibitions in parts 2 and 3. A more
straightforward way to achieve that result, and a way consistent with
51. Id. at 791-92.
52. One could also look to the framers' and ratifiers' other writings to determine
how they use language, what one might call inter-textualism. For example, consider
the Constitution's provision that federal judges "shall hold their Offices during good
Behavior." U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. The main interpretive question is whether this
clause sets forth a ground for judicial impeachment, or whether the clause simply
states that federal judges shall have life tenure. To the modern ear, "good Behavior"
sounds an awful lot like a standard of conduct. See Paul E. McGreal, Impeachment as
a Remedy for Ethics Violations, 41 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1369, 1375-76 (2000). But, the
writings of those who drafted and debated the Constitution show that they used the
term "good Behavior" simply to mean life tenure. Id.
53. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
54. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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the drafting of Article I, section 10, discussed above, might be the
following:
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.
Congress shall not, without the consent of the Legislatures of the
States concerned, form or erect a new State within the Jurisdiction
of any other State, or form a State by the Junction of two or more
States, or Parts of States.
This language more naturally expresses that both dividing and
consolidating states are allowed with the consent of Congress and the
states. Furthermore, Article I, section 10 illustrates that the framers
used just such a structure -prohibition, followed by allowance for
consent, followed by an enumerated list separated by commas-to
express a similar idea. Given this textual comparison, we can infer
that the drafters meant something different when they took a different
approach in drafting the Statehood Clause. Specifically, they meant
the consent provision to apply only to part 3 regarding consolidation
of states.
Some criticize intratextualism as making too much of small
differences in language. According to these critics, the intratextualist
gives the Constitution's drafters too much credit, imputing to them
care in usage of language that is unsupported by history."5 One need
not refute intratextualism's critics to find it a useful tool of
interpretation. As with rules of grammar, one can concede that
intratextualism is not dispositive but nonetheless continue to believe
in its relevance. To borrow a metaphor from evidence law,
intratextualism is one more brick in building the wall of constitutional
meaning.56 At this point, intratextualism bolsters the interpretation
suggested by the rules of grammar: the consent provision applies only
to consolidation of states, not division.
Text need not be the final word in interpretation. Even those who
make text the primary, or even sole, interpretive focus reject textual
interpretations that produce an absurd result." Here, the question is
whether interpreting the Statehood Clause to allow consolidation of
states but not division of a state produces an absurd result. Asked
another way, is there any reason to allow consolidation of states but
not division?
55. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law,
108 Yale L.J. 1225, 1287-95 (1999); Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules,
Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 Harv. L Rev. 730, 748-52
(2000).
56. Professors Vermeule and Young note that this "weak" version of
intratextualism is "relatively uncontroversial." Vermeule & Young, supra note 55, at
734.
57. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment).
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The circumstances of Texas statehood suggest a reason to
distinguish division from consolidation. Recall that southern, slave-
supporting members of Congress inserted the five-state provision to
sow the seeds of greater political influence." As a slave state, Texas
bolstered the slave-state delegations in the House and Senate. Four
additional Texas states would add eight more slave-state senators,
increasing the Senate by 7.5%, from sixty to sixty-eight.
As the Texas example illustrates, a majority party could use state
division to perpetuate its hold on government power. That party
could divide a sympathetic state into infinitely smaller units, each
entitled to two senators. The majority party would overwhelm its
political opponents, as well as the other states, in the Senate. All this
could be done over the objection of minority parties and without
consent of the other states. Consequently, it makes some sense for
the Constitution to prohibit division of states, which Congress can
manipulate to political ends, while allowing consolidation, which is not
so vulnerable to partisan abuse. A strict grammatical reading is not
absurd.
The preceding textualist arguments view the Constitution through
the grammatical rules of today. But, did the drafters and ratifiers
follow the same grammatical conventions? Specifically, did the
founding generation use semi-colons the way we do today? The
existing evidence suggests that the drafters either ignored the
significance of punctuation or used semi-colons much as we use
commas today.59 The Supremacy Clause of Article VI illustrates this
usage:6°
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding. 61
The last part of the Supremacy Clause, after the final comma, is
known as the non obstante provision.62 Under modern grammar rules,
the non obstante provision would be confined to the portion of the
58. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
59. Professor Caleb Nelson describes their practice as follows: "To lawyers of the
day, little hinged on the difference between a semi-colon and a comma. Not only
were punctuation marks thought to lack the legal status of words, but commas and
semi-colons were not as distinct as they are today." Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va.
L. Rev. 225, 258-59 (2000); for examples of the different usage, see also Joseph
Robertson, An Essay on Punctuation (1789); Noah Webster, A Grammatical Institute
for the English Language app. 118 (6th ed. 1800).
60. This example is taken from Nelson, supra note 59, at 257-59.
61. U.S. Const. art. VI, §1, cl. 2.
62. On the meaning and function of the non obstante provision, see Nelson, supra
note 59, at 254-60.
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Supremacy Clause after the final semi-colon, applying only to state
judges who interpret or apply federal law. In a world where semi-
colons are not terminal punctuation, however, the non obstante
provision refers to the entire Supremacy Clause, binding all actors
who interpret or apply federal law. History supports the latter
reading 3 and therefore the non obstante provision is a good example
of the drafters' indifference between commas and semi-colons.
State ratifications of the Constitution hold further evidence of
historical semi-colon usage. Many states appended a copy of the
Constitution to their form of ratification. On several of these copies,
punctuation differs in many places from the punctuation of the
document promulgated by the drafting convention.' One common
difference is the substitution of commas for semi-colons.' An
example of this switch, of particular relevance here, occurred in the
South Carolina form of ratification. In the Constitution included with
that state's ratification, the Statehood Clause reads as follows:
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no
new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any
other State, nor any state be formed by the Junction of two or more
States, or parts of states, without the consent of the Legislatures of
the states concerned as well as of the Congress.'
The second semi-colon is now a comma, removing any grammatical
doubt that the consent provision applies to division of states.
Importantly, none of the South Carolina delegates argued that this
change in punctuation altered the Clause's meaning. 7 Thus, the
South Carolina form of ratification is best read as confirming the
historical indifference between semi-colons and commas.'
The textual answer to our question depends, therefore, in part on
whether we use the grammatical conventions of the past or the
present. One way to choose is to ask whether past or present
grammar best promotes the democratic legitimacy of the Constitution.
On the one hand, using present conventions promotes democratic
self-government by making the Constitution's text comprehensible to
current-day readers.69 The average educated citizen could think and
63. Id. at 255.
64. See id. at 258 n.102.
65. Id. at 259 n.103.
66. 2 Documentary History of the Constitution of the United States of America,
1786-1870, at 136 (1998).
67. 4 Jonathan Elliot, Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 253
(1788) (debate in South Carolina ratifying convention regarding the Statehood
Clause).
68. A similar switch in punctuation occurred in the copy of the United States
Constitution included vith the Texas laws accepting annexation. 2 The Laws of Texas
(1822-1897) 1262 (1898). In that copy, the Statehood Clause's second semi-colon is
changed to a comma. Id. at 1262.
69. See generally Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword:
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argue about the Constitution without researching historical
grammatical practices. Increased participation in turn would yield
two further benefits. First, a greater diversity of views would enrich
constitutional dialogue. Second, wider participation would give more
people a stake in and foster greater acceptance of constitutional
decisions.
On the other hand, using past conventions also promotes
democratic legitimacy. As some have argued, acts gain democratic
legitimacy only after sustained, heightened public debate and
acceptance. 0 At the time of the founding, the public intensely
debated and ratified the Constitution as understood under then-
prevailing rules of grammar. While those rules have changed over
time, the American public has neither debated nor approved the
effect of such changes, if any, on the Constitution's meaning."' Thus,
changed constitutional readings caused by changes in grammar do not
bear the hallmarks of democratic legitimacy.
Apart from democratic principles, the textualist ought to distinguish
changes in grammar from other changes that bear on constitutional
meaning, such as changes in word usage or in social circumstances.
When word usages or social circumstances change over time, there is
good reason to infer corresponding changes in constitutional meaning.
In each case, the reason behind such change will often suggest a
reason for a corresponding constitutional change. To see the
distinction, consider an example of changed word usage and changed
social circumstances.
First, consider the word "people," used twice in the original
Constitution.7" The Supreme Court held that "people" refers to those
individuals who may participate in American political government."
At the time of the founding, many accepted that very few "people"-
basically, white, male property owners-could participate in
American political life. 4 Today, we have a much more expansive
view of political participation, so it would seem irrational to give the
term "people" anything but the ordinary usage "all individuals." The
Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1986) (discussing the theory that
citizens' self-government is furthered by judicial self-government).
70. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 108-13 (1991) [hereinafter
Ackerman, Foundations]; Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 261-65
(1998) [hereinafter Ackerman, Transformations].
71. Professor Ackerman argues that the public has debated and approved extra-
Article V constitutional changes wrought during the New Deal era. See Ackerman,
Foundations, supra note 70, at 119-21; Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 70, at
261-65. For criticisms of this view, see William E. Forbath, Constitutional Change and
the Politics of History, 108 Yale L.J. 1917, 1921-22 (1999).
72. U.S. Const. preamble ("We the people of the United States... ."); id. art. I, §
2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year by the People of the several States ... ").
73. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,404-05 (1856).
74. Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union 1781-1789, at 173 (1987).
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reason behind the change in usage (increased social diversity and
acceptance of others) suggests a good reason for constitutional change
(greater inclusion in political activities).
Second, consider the meaning of the word "commerce" as used in
the Constitution. When drafted, the Constitution's Commerce Clause
targeted state-erected barriers to free trade. 5  For example, some
states imposed prohibitive taxes on goods that crossed their borders.76
In that context, most economic activity was local, and "commerce"
became a national concern only when goods were traded across state
lines.' Today, however, we have a nationally integrated economy
where local economic activity in one state can substantially affect the
larger national economy. In this context, "commerce" is more readily
a national concern, and Congress' power to regulate interstate
"commerce" has naturally grown.78 Changed social circumstances
(industrial and post-industrial economic development) implied a
changed constitutional reading (greater federal power over interstate
commerce).79
Unlike changes in word usage or social circumstances, changes in
grammar do not imply corresponding changes in constitutional
meaning. Grammar changes are substantively neutral; they do not
signal changes in underlying substantive ideas or concepts.
Consequently, any corresponding changed constitutional readings
would be mere accidents, logically unrelated to why the grammar
rules have changed.
In sum, both democratic principles and logic favor historical
grammar rules. Here, that would mean treating the semi-colons as
commas, or non-existent, and reading the consent provision to allow
division of an existing state. The next four sections examine whether
history, structure, past government practice, and judicial precedent
support this reading.
2. History
This section looks at two types of history regarding the Statehood
Clause. First, the drafting history details the Clause's evolution
through various versions and amendments. Second, debate over the
75. See Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1191, 1211-16 (1998).
76. David Hutchison, The Foundations of the Constitution 102-04 (1975).
77. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
78. See id at 574-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,583-85 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79. Bobbitt, Fate, supra note 10, at 36 ("The contemporary understanding of the
word 'commerce'... is far more comprehensive and hence a more promising source
of national power than the understanding of a century ago, reflecting our more
interconnected economy as well as our awareness of that interconnectedness.").
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Clause reveals whether the Convention delegates said anything about
division of existing states. In the end, both sources support authority
to divide a state with consent.
The drafting history of the Statehood Clause supports the historical
textual reading that allows state division with consent of Congress and
the state involved. The Statehood Clause started as a simple grant of
power to Congress to admit new states. Next, the drafting convention
added a provision allowing for division of states with the consent of
Congress and the state to be divided. The convention then added a
provision regarding the consolidation of states, again with the
permission of Congress and the affected states. At this point, the text
still plainly allowed division of states with consent. Finally, the
Statehood Clause went into the black box of the drafting
convention-the Committee of Style-which edited the Clause to its
present form. Because the Committee of Style intended no
substantive changes, we may assume that the present Statehood
Clause is simply an unclear way to provide for state division with
consent. The remainder of this section reviews this drafting history.
The Virginia Plan, submitted to the delegates near the beginning of
the drafting Convention, contained a simple provision for admission
of new states:
10.Resolvd. that provision ought to be made for the admission of
States lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether
from a voluntary junction of Government & Territory or otherwise,
with the consent of a number of voices in the National legislature
less than the whole.8°
The convention adopted this provision without recorded debate. 81
Language allowing division of a state first appeared in the draft
constitution reported by the Committee of Detail:
New States lawfully constituted or established within the limits of
the United States may be admitted, by the Legislature, into this
Government; but to such admission the consent of two thirds of the
members present in each House shall be necessary. If a new State
shall arise within the limits of any of the present States, the consent
of the Legislatures of such States shall be also necessary to its
admission. If the admission be consented to, the new States shall be
admitted on the same terms with the original States. But the
Legislature may make conditions with the new States, concerning
the public debt which shall be then subsisting. 82
This text unambiguously authorizes division of a state if Congress and
the affected state consent. Debate over this provision centered on
whether new states ought to be admitted on equal terms with existing
80. 1 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 22 (1937).
81. Id. at 121.
82. 2 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 188 (1937).
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states.83 Gouverneur Morris moved to delete the last two sentences,
dealing with the provision for equal admission and the public debt
respectively, and the Convention agreed.' In lieu of other
amendments, Morris then simply moved to substitute the following
language for the entire Clause:
New States may be admitted by the Legislature into this Union: but
no new State shaH be erected within the limits of any of the present
States, without the consent of the Legislature of such State, as well
as of the Genl. Legislature[.]8
Again, the text still allows division with consent. The Convention
approved this language with only minor tinkering.t' Finally, John
Dickinson proposed language to address consolidation of states, which
the Convention approved. 7
After debating the entire draft reported by the Committee of
Detail, the Convention convened a Committee of Style to consolidate
the various provisions, as amended, and clean up the language. As
shown above, the Statehood Clause submitted to the Committee of
Style plainly allowed division of a state with consent of Congress and
the affected state. The Committee of Style rewrote that text to the
Clause we have today, inserting the semi-colons that bedevil our
current-day textualist.88
We should not read the Committee's change to alter the Clause's
meaning. First, that was not the Committee's role.' They were called
the Committee of Style-and not the Committee of Substantive
Revisions-for a reason: Their role was to clean up the document's
style. Just because their stylistic revisions may have at times obscured,
rather than clarified, constitutional meaning does not mean we should
attribute substantive designs to their work.
83. Id. at 454-56. For example, the delegates debated whether new states
admitted from western territories should have equal representation in the Senate. Id.
at 454 ("The existing small States enjoy an equality now, and for that reason are
admitted to it in the Senate. This reason is not applicable to [new] Western States.").
84. Id.
85. Id. at 455.
86. Id. The Convention voted to change the word "limits" to -jurisdiction." Id. at
463. This change was intended to clarify that Vermont could be admitted to the
Union without New York's consent. Id. Apparently, some delegates believed that
Vermont was not within New York's "jurisdiction," but arguably was within the
"limits" of New York. Id.
87. Id. at 465 ("Nor shall any State be formed by the junction of two or more
States or parts thereof, without the consent of the Legislatures of such States, as well
as of the Legislature of the U. States.").
8& Id. at 602.
89. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 538-39 (1969) ("'[Tlhe Committee...
had no authority from the Convention to make alterations of substance in the
Constitution as voted by the Convention, nor did it purport to do so....' (quoting
Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution 422 n.1 (1928)); 2 Farrand, supra
note 82, at 553 (describing the Committee of Style's role as "to revise the stile of and
arrange the articles which had been agreed to").
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Second, none of the delegates suggested that the Committee had
changed the Statehood Clause's meaning. The draft approved and
submitted to the Committee of Style plainly allowed division of states.
If the Committee had reversed that decision, surely some delegate
would have at least remarked upon the change. But, the Convention
approved the Committee's redrafted Clause without debate. Again,
we may infer that the Committee's edits made no substantive change.
Similarly, the drafting and ratifying debates support state division
with consent. Delegates to the drafting and state ratifying
conventions spoke as if the proposed Statehood Clause allowed
division. The most striking example comes from the drafting
Convention's only extended debate over the Clause. All delegates
who spoke agreed that an existing state may be divided. The only
dispute was whether Congress should be allowed to do so without the
state's consent.' Several delegates were concerned that states such as
Virginia and North Carolina were laying claim to lands extending far
to the west.91 These states could assert political control over western
land and people without gaining those people's consent?0 Even
worse, the states could maintain their government and other valuable
establishments a considerable distance from the western lands,
effectively freezing westerners out of state government. 3  This
exploitation of western land and people would continue unabated as
long as the Constitution required a state's consent before Congress
could divide a state.94 To prevent this abuse, some delegates argued,
Congress ought to have power to divide a state without its consent.
Those favoring state consent made three arguments. First, granting
Congress power to unilaterally divide a state was an intolerable
invasion of state sovereignty. States ought to retain that central
power of political self-determination, defining the bounds of their
political community.95 Second, the power to unilaterally divide a state
could be abused. For example, any group of state citizens could
petition Congress for division of a state simply out of disagreement
with a state's policy.96 If the losers in state politics could always do so,
"nothing but confusion would ensue."'  Third, unilateral
congressional division violated the democratic principle of majority
90. 2 Farrand, supra note 82, at 454-64.
91. Id. at 455-62.
92. Id. at 463-64.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 464.
95. Id. at 462 (James Wilson argued, "[hie knew of nothing that would give
greater or juster alarm than the doctrine, that a political society is to be tome asunder
without its own consent").
96. Id. at 455 (Butler argued, "[w]henever taxes should press on the people,
demagogues would set up their schemes of new States").
97. Id.
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rule.98 A small minority within the state could petition Congress for
division, and Congress could accede regardless of what the majority of
the state desired.
The Convention debate shows a common understanding that
Congress may divide a state; the only question was whether to require
state consent. The Federalist Papers reinforce this understanding.
James Madison's Federalist No. 43 is the only paper to discuss the
Statehood Clause: "[t]he particular precaution against the erection of
new States, by the partition of a State without its consent, quiets the
jealousy of the large States .... -99 The evil addressed is not division
of a state simpliciter, but rather division of a state "without its
consent." The proportionate "precaution" was to require state
consent, not to prohibit all division. Thus, Madison is best read as
endorsing division wvith proper consent.
History weighs heavily on the side of state division with consent.
The drafting history shows that the initial drafts plainly allowed
division, and that only the Committee of Style's inartful editing
muddied the waters. The debates over the Statehood Clause show
that the Committee intended no substantive change to the Clause.
3. Structure
Given history's strong verdict, considering structure may seem
overkill, but, a review of structure still serves two purposes. First, it
can help determine whether our discussion of text or history missed
some important aspect of constitutional law. Second, it serves as a
warm-up to discussion of our next issue, where text and history will
not provide as clear an answer.
Federalism, one of our most basic constitutional structures, refers to
the relationship between the states and the national government. As
applied by the current Supreme Court, that relationship has three
main aspects.100 First, each state entered the Union with its
sovereignty intact, except where the Constitution abrogates that
98. Id. at 456 (James Wilson argued, "[t]he aim of those in opposition to the
article, he perceived, was that the Genl. Government should abet the nminority, & by
that means divide a State against its own consent" (emphasis in original)).
99. The Federalist No. 43, at 286 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
100. As Professor Sanford Levinson has argued, the Supreme Court indisputably
plays a major role in establishing the language of "law talk" that lawyers use in
arguing about constitutional law. See Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. Pa. J. Const.
L. 573, 578 (2000), stating that:
Whatever the actual efficacy of the Supreme Court in changing the behavior
of American institutions, it seems indisputable that the Court sometimes
fulfills the function of the French Academy in establishing the conventions
of 'law talk,' so that all properly socialized lawyers, and many non-lawyers as




sovereignty. 101 Second, several clauses of the Constitution abrogate
aspects of state sovereignty by expressly prohibiting the states from
taking certain actions."° Third, the Constitution abrogates other
aspects of state sovereignty by granting the national government
certain enumerated powers'013 and providing that all duly enacted
national laws supercede conflicting state lawsY°4 As a rough summary,
the Constitution and the national government are supreme within
their limited spheres, with the states otherwise retaining their
sovereignty.
As sovereigns, the states would possess the power to subdivide
themselves into smaller sovereign units." Therefore, in our federalist
system, the states retain this power unless the Constitution has
withdrawn it. The Statehood Clause is ill-suited to abrogate a pre-
constitutional state power. First, the Statehood Clause is not included
in the express limitations on state power which are set forth in Article
I, section 10. Rather, the Clause is in Article IV, section 3, which sets
forth two grants of federal power. 06 This placement suggests that the
Statehood Clause adds a federal role to state division, as opposed to
abrogating state power to do so.
Second, the Statehood Clause's text is an awkward way to abrogate
state sovereignty. Again, consider Article I, section 10. That section
explicitly abrogates state sovereignty, using the language "No State
shall" to preface its litanies of prohibited conduct.10° Conversely, the
Statehood Clause does not direct any prohibition against the states.
Again, a rather equivocal way to abrogate state sovereign power.
In sum, states appear to retain the power to divide, subject only to
Congress' power to admit those sub-divisions into statehood. No
clause of the Constitution abrogates that power. In addition,
placement of the Statehood Clause within the Constitution suggests
that the Clause is not a limitation on state power.
4. Precedent
The Supreme Court has never decided whether the Statehood
Clause allows division of an existing state. Several of its opinions,
however, have described the Clause in language suggesting that
101. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2247-54 (1999).
102. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
103. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 8.
104. Id. art. VI, §1, cl. 2.
105. See Jianming Shen, Sovereignty, Statehood, Self-Determination, and the Issue
of Taiwan, 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1101, 1150-52 (2000). This power should be
distinguished from the power of part of a state to secede without the consent of the
state's general government. Id. at 1152-55.
106. Article IV, § 3 grants Congress power to admit new states and to make laws
for American territories. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 3.
107. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance,
or confederation .... ).
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division is allowed. For example, in Coyle v. Smith,' the Court
decided that Congress could not require a newly-admitted state to
locate its capital in a specific city." 9 In describing Congress' power to
admit new states, the Court explained: "[tihe only expressed
restriction upon this power is that no new State shall be formed within
the jurisdiction of any other State, nor by the junction of two or more
States... without the consent of such States, as well as of the
Congress." ''1 The Court's paraphrase of the Statehood Clause clearly
allows division with consent. The Court went even further in Pollard
v. Hagan,"' changing the second semi-colon to a comma in quoting
the Statehood Clause."2 Of course, because neither case decided
whether the Clause allows division, these passages technically are
dicta, and the Court is free to disavow these descriptions in a later
case.113 Nonetheless, they provide some evidence that the Supreme
Court reads the Statehood Clause to allow division of a state.
5. Past Government Practice
The First Congress admitted two new states by dividing existing
states." 4  In 1791, Congress admitted Kentucky, which was an
undisputed part of Virginia,"5 and Vermont, which New York claimed
was within its jurisdiction." 6  In each case, the appropriate state
legislature consented to admission, and Congress voted to admit. All
actors agreed that the Constitution allowed division of a state with
proper consent.
This early congressional practice provides strong evidence
supporting division with consent.117 The First Congress consisted of
108. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
109. Id. at 565-66.
110. Id. at 566.
111. 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
112. Id at 223.
113. Cf Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2333-34 (2000) (disavowing
over twenty years of opinions that referred to the Miranda warnings as non-
constitutional prophylactic rules).
114. See David P. Currie, The Constinaion in Congress: Substantive Issues in the
First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 837-40 (1994).
115. See 2 Annals of Cong. 1774 (1790).
116. Id. at 1798. While New York claimed that Vermont was within its jurisdiction,
the territorial government of Vermont did not agree. Thus, Vermont did not believe
it needed New York's consent to gain statehood. But, because New York consented
anyway, the issue of New York's rights was moot. The main point is that regardless of
New York's rights, all parties agreed that if Vermont was within New York's
jurisdiction, Congress could still admit Vermont with New York's consent.
117. Later congressional practice also supports division of an existing state. In
1820, Congress admitted Maine, which was formerly part of Massachusetts, see Act of
Mar. 3, 1820, ch. 19, 16th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 Stat. 544 (admitting Maine to the Union
with Massachusetts' prior consent), and in 1863, Congress admitted West Virginia,
which was formerly part of Virginia. See Act of Dec. 31, 1862, ch. 6, 37th Cong., 3rd
Sess., 12 Stat. 633.
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many members of the federal drafting and state ratifying conventions.
Presumably, these men knew what the Constitution allowed. Their
contemporaneous, uncontested assent to division of two states-both
Kentucky and Vermont were admitted on unanimous votes-is
compelling evidence of the Constitution's meaning. 8
6. Coda
History, structure, judicial precedent, and past government practice
all support division with consent. The answer to our first question,
then, is one of those happy cases where most of the available
interpretive data points in the same direction. The only uncertainty
arose under textual analysis, where changes in grammatical usage
obscured the Clause's meaning. One important lesson is that text is
often useless unless placed within some larger context, and that the
other methods of interpretation supply that context.
B. Simultaneous Admission and Consent to Division
Given that Congress can divide a state with the state's consent, the
issue becomes whether Congress can simultaneously create a new
state and consent to later division of that state. This section analyzes
that issue.
1. Text
Again, consider the relevant text:
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no
new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any
other State... without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned as well as of the Congress." 9
The Clause speaks of Congress giving its "Consent" to a "new
State... formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State."
Thus, the consent must be to division of a "State," which must be
either one of the thirteen ratifying states or a state later admitted by
Congress. Accordingly, for the five-state provision to serve as
consent, Texas must have been a "State" at the time Congress gave
that consent. But, Congress included the five-state provision in the
very legislation that admitted Texas. So, the question is whether the
same vote of Congress can both create a "State" and bestow
Congress' consent to future division of that "State."
118. Cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (in deciding
whether Congress could charter a national bank, Chief Justice John Marshall gave
interpretive weight to the fact that the First Congress passed the bank bill after full
consideration of the constitutional issues).
119. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3.
2416 [Vol. 69
2001] THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS TEXTUALISM
The question is further complicated because, as an historical matter,
Texas was not admitted to the Union upon the passage of the joint
resolution that contained the five-state provision. Instead, as noted
briefly above,12 the joint resolution of Congress allowed the President
to offer Texas admission as either a free state or a slave state subject
to division. President Tyler offered Texas admission as a slave state
with the five-state provision, and Texas accepted. Congress then
confirmed admission of Texas. Consequently, the state of Texas did
not exist until some time after Congress approved the five-state
provision. Technically, it is incorrect to argue that Congress admitted
Texas and that the simultaneous consent immediately attached to the
newly-admitted state. As a plain textual matter, the five-state
provision seems dead.
Once again, this is merely text in a vacuum. In context, the matter
may look different. Textually speaking, the most important context is
the first part of the Statehood Clause, which allows Congress to admit
new states. Presumably, Congress could have carved the Republic of
Texas into five territories and simply admitted each one as a new
state. If so, why not allow Congress to admit a state and allow the
state to determine whether division is, or becomes, appropriate?
Using the textualist's rubric, would it be absurd to allow Congress to
divide a territory and admit multiple states, but prohibit Congress
from admitting a single state and consenting to its future division?
Federalism principles suggest that it would be absurd. One reason
the Constitution divides power between national and local
governments is that some matters require central planning while other
matters require tailoring to local needs and circumstances.' 2, The
decision to admit a state could be said to have both aspects. On the
one hand, Congress decides whether admission of a territory is in the
interests of the nation as a whole. On the other hand, the newly-
admitted state may be best able to determine whether it can
effectively govern itself as a single state, or whether division into
multiple states, along geographic, political, or other lines, would be
most advantageous. Thus, simultaneous admission and consent to
division may be a sensible accommodation of federalism principles.
Further, we do not gain much by forcing Congress to postpone its
consent. Congress could take two consecutive votes, the first on
admission and the second on consent to division. Nothing of
substance is gained by forcing this form on Congress.
These rationales hold even in the case, as wvith Texas, where consent
briefly ante-dates admission. In the Texas case, Congress
120. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
121. See Paul E. Peterson, The Price of Federalism 17-39 (1995) (arguing that local
governments are better suited to handle developmental matters and national
governments are better situated to handle redistributive policies); David L Shapiro,
Federalism: A Dialogue 75-91 (1995).
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simultaneously made its decisions to admit and consent to division.
The mere fact that the President had to carry out the mandate does
not affect the reasonableness of considering Congress' actions as a
single policy decision. Moreover, forcing Congress to make a second
vote would not serve any useful purpose.
In sum, text offers conflicting guidance. On the one hand, the
Clause's language suggests that a state must already exist for Congress
to consent to its division. On the other hand, it seems absurd to allow
Congress to admit a territory as several states but not admit it as one
state with consent to future division. The other methods will have to
decide the issue.
2. History
History provides little help on the present question. Neither the
drafting nor the ratifying debates mention the issue. Also, none of the
issues debated bear on the question of simultaneous admission and
consent to division. The debates mainly discuss whether new states
should be admitted on equal terms with existing states, 122 and whether
Congress could divide a state without its consent. 23 Neither concern
bears on the issue of simultaneous admission and consent.
3. Structure
As discussed above in reference to the Statehood Clause's text,
allowing simultaneous admission and consent preserves aspects of
federalism by promoting proper allocation of decisions between local
and national government. 24 Congress may consider the national
interest in deciding whether to admit the state, and the state
legislature may consider local needs and circumstances in deciding
whether to divide. Each level of government makes the decision best
suited to its situation.
Another constitutional structure bearing on our issue is the
accountability of representatives to their constituents. When in doubt,
we ought to choose the constitutional interpretation that promotes
accountability. For example, the Supreme Court has held that
allowing Congress to commandeer states into making law erodes
accountability." In commandeering, Congress makes an unpopular
policy choice and then forces states to enact that policy choice into
law.1 26 Since state legislators ultimately make the applicable law, the
122. 2 Farrand, supra note 82, at 454.
123. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
125. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182-83 (1992).
126. For example, New York v. United States involved a federal law that directed
the states to enact specific regulations for siting facilities to dispose of low level
radioactive waste. Id. at 152-53. This law allowed Congress to take credit for the
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public will hold them accountable for the policy choice even though
that choice was made by Congress. Because the wrong government
actors are blamed, commandeering upsets the structure of
accountable government.
Like the prohibition on commandeering, allowing simultaneous
admission and division promotes accountable decision-making.
Congress gets to make the policy choice whether to admit a state to
the Union. In doing so, Congress considers the national interest and
is accountable to a national constituency. By pre-consenting to
division of the newly-admitted state, Congress allows the new state's
government to decide whether to divide. The decision whether to
divide will bear most heavily on the citizens of the newly-admitted
state. Accordingly, the principle of accountability is best served by
leaving that decision to the newly-admitted state's government.
Thus, while not overwhelming, structure supports simultaneous
admission and consent to division. Allowing Congress to do so
enhances federalism and promotes accountability by properly
allocating decision-making power between Congress and the states.
4. Past Government Practice
Congress has admitted new states thirty-seven times. Each time,
Congress presumably acted upon its understanding of what the
Statehood Clause allows. This section examines several state
admissions for clues as to what actions Congress believes it may take
prior to or simultaneously with admitting a state.
In the election contest styled Phelps and Cavanaugh, the House
considered whether to seat two representatives from Minnesota.121 In
1857, in anticipation of gaining statehood, the Territory of Minnesota
held congressional elections.1" After admission into the Union, when
the state's two representatives appeared at the Thirty-Fifth
Congress, 129 the question arose whether Minnesota's pre-statehood
elections were valid.130 Opponents argued that only states were
decision to tackle low level radioactive waste, while forcing states to take the blame
for enacting and administering a specific regulatory scheme. Id. at 168-69.
127. D.W. Bartlett, Cases of Contested Elections in Congress, from 1834 to 1865,
Inclusive, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 38-57, at 248 (1865) [hereinafter Bartlett, Contested
Elections].
128. Id. Another issue was the validity of a congressional election held prior to
statehood. Id at 249 ("An objection is urged to the right of the claimants to their
seats on the ground that their election was prior to the admission of the State into the
Union." (quoting Report of the Committee of Elections)). The Committee of
Elections concluded that pre-statehood elections were valid. Id.
129. The territory had elected three representatives, but only two were sent to
Congress when Minnesota was allocated two representatives upon statehood. Id. at
250.
130. Id. at 249. It was also objected that Minnesota's elections were at large, which
violated the requirement of the Apportionment Act of 1842 that all House members
be elected by single-member districts. Id. ("Another objection urged against the
2419
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
entitled to elect members of the House, and because Minnesota was
not a state at the time of the elections, the results were void.
The House Committee of Elections considered the issue and
concluded that the Minnesota elections were proper. Prior to
admission, Congress had passed an enabling act that authorized
Minnesota to form a state government and draft a state constitution.",
Implicit in the enabling act was Congress' permission to take all
actions necessary to prepare Minnesota for statehood.1 32 As a newly-
admitted state, Minnesota would be entitled to immediate
representation in Congress.133 The enabling act allowed Minnesota to
elect representatives prior to statehood to allow those representatives
to take their seats immediately upon admission. Thus, the Minnesota
elections were valid and their representatives ought to be seated. The
House concurred in this conclusion, voting 135 to 63 to seat
Minnesota's representatives.13
Phelps and Cavanaugh shows Congress taking pre-statehood
action-the enabling act-that had post-statehood validity. The
enabling act authorized pre-statehood elections that supplied post-
statehood congressional representatives. This precedent could yield
two different rules. On the one hand, Phelps and Cavanaugh could
stand for Congress' power to take any pre-statehood action that is in
anticipation of statehood. An enabling act is designed to prepare a
territory for statehood, thus it is a perfect source for such legislation.
Similarly, the very legislation that admits a state would serve the same
function. Thus, on this reading of Phelps and Cavanaugh, the five-
state provision, which was included in Congress' joint resolution
authorizing annexation of Texas, would be a valid congressional act in
anticipation of statehood.
On the other hand, Phelps and Cavanaugh may stand for Congress'
power to take only those pre-statehood actions that are necessary for
preparing a territory for statehood. Recall, all states are entitled to full
representation in Congress, and pre-statehood elections are the only
means of selecting representatives who will be ready to serve
immediately upon statehood. Conversely, the five-state provision did
not authorize anything Texas needed for full statehood. Indeed,
admission of the members who claim seats in the House of Representatives from
Minnesota is, because of their election by general ticket instead of districts."). For
further analysis of the constitutionality of the single-member district requirement, see
generally Paul E. McGreal, Unconstitutional Politics, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 519
(2001).
131. Act of May 11, 1858, ch. 31,35th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 Stat. 285.
132. Bartlett, Contested Elections, supra note 127, at 249.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 251. The Committee's Report concluded with a resolution that read in
pertinent part: "Resolved, That W.W. Phelps and James M. Cavanaugh, claiming seats
as members of this house from the State of Minnesota, be admitted and sworn as
such ..." Id. at 250.
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Texas has been a full state for over 150 years without exercising its
rights under the five-state provision. Rather, that provision looked
beyond statehood to the admission of other states. Thus, the second
reading of Phelps and Cavanaugh does not support Congress' power
to consent to division before statehood.
Phelps and Cavanaugh illustrates the difficulty in using past
government practice as precedent. Past government practices serve a
meaningful role only if it is clear what aspects of the past practice
were significant and why. In Phelps and Cavanaugh, we know that
Congress was allowed to authorize pre-statehood elections. But, why?
Was it because Congress acted in anticipation of statehood? Or, was
it because pre-statehood elections were necessary to exercise full
statehood upon admission? Unfortunately, past practices do not
always come with judicial-like opinions explaining their full rationale.
Even the Committee report in Phelps and Cavanaugh devotes only a
single paragraph to the issue, leaving these important questions
unanswered.135 To make past practices fully usable in constitutional
interpretation, then, some other source must supply the rationale for
the practice.
One source for such a rationale is Congress' practices in admitting
other states into the Union. We could examine Congress' pre-
statehood actions in admitting other states. Specifically, has Congress
consistently limited pre-statehood legislation to matters necessary to
statehood? Or, has Congress addressed other matters in pre-
statehood legislation? The answers to these questions might imply a
rationale behind the practices as well as provide a context in which to
better understand Phelps and Cavanaugh."6
One matter commonly handled in pre-statehood legislation is the
disposition of cases then-pending in the territorial courts. As national
courts, territorial courts are subject to regulation only by Congress.! -
Upon admission of a state, the territorial court no longer exists and
thus cannot act on its pending cases. Furthermore, the newly-
135. Bartlett, Contested Elections, supra note 127, at 249.
136. At first glance, the Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise seem
to be such legislation. First, the Northwest Ordinance, enacted in 1787, specified the
circumstances under which a community outside an existing state could organize into
a territory and apply for statehood. See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. V, The
Avalon Project at the Yale Law School, available at http:/www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalonnworder.htm. Second, the Missouri Compromise, enacted in 1820,
provided that each state admitted to the Union from the Louisiana Purchase that was
located north of Missouri's southern border would be a free state. See Act of Mar. 6,
1820, ch. 22, § 8, 16th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 Stat. 545, 548; see also An Act to Organize the
Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, ch. 59, 33th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 Stat. 277 (1854)
(repealing Missouri Compromise). While each law addressed matters related to
statehood, neither purported to give pre-statehood congressional consent to state
action to be taken post-statehood.
137. Freeborn v. Smith, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 160, 173-74 (1864); Hunt v. Palao, 45 U.S.
(4 How.) 588,590 (1846).
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admitted state cannot transfer or otherwise dispose of the pending
cases because states have no power over national courts."' So, unless
Congress addresses the matter, the pending cases are left in limbo.
For this reason, Congress has often provided for cases pending in
territorial courts in legislation passed either before or simultaneously
with admission of a state.139
It is not clear whether disposition of cases pending in territorial
courts is a matter necessary for statehood. Regardless of whether
those cases are provided for, the newly-admitted state will be able to
establish its government and constitution. Further, the new state can
participate fully in the new national government, electing House
members, senators, and presidential electors. Therefore, only the
litigants in territorial courts will be inconvenienced: their cases will be
in limbo, unless they re-file in the state or federal courts of the newly-
admitted state. Either way, the state can accomplish all it needs for
statehood.
Conversely, the newly-admitted state may not be able to fully
organize its judiciary until it is clear how the territorial cases will be
treated. Will the new state judges need to hear the old territorial
cases? If so, how many? These questions may affect how many state
judgeships are created and whether (and where) the records of the
territorial courts should be transferred. Additionally, pending
litigation should not be casually postponed to the distant future, to be
addressed when convenient. Due process requires timely adjudication
of parties' rights. Consequently, the matter of pending territorial
cases can be seen as necessary to statehood.
Even after examining another practice, it is still not clear how
Congress decides what issues may be addressed pre-statehood.
Arguments can be made both ways in most situations. At this point,
perhaps a dose of judicial precedent can help us better see the issue.
5. Precedent
The canonical constitutional law case McCulloch v. Maryland4 "
may help resolve the confusion over Congress' past practices in
admitting states. One issue in McCulloch was the scope of Congress'
implied powers. All agreed that Congress could exercise certain
implied powers that were "necessary and proper" to executing
Congress' enumerated powers. The question was how broadly to
construe those implied powers. For example, Congress has the
enumerated powers to lay and collect taxes, coin money, and to raise
138. Freeborn, 69 U.S. at 174; Hunt, 45 U.S. at 590.
139. See, e.g., An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the
Union, § 12, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 73 Stat. 9 (1959); Alaska Statehood Act, § 13, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess., 72 Stat. 339, 349 (1958).
140. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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and support an army and a navy.141 The question in McCulloch was
whether Congress had the implied power to create a national bank in
aid of exercising those enumerated powers.
One camp argued that the Constitution limits Congress to only
those powers "absolutely necessary" to exercising an enumerated
power. The other camp contended that the Constitution gave
Congress more leeway, allowing those implied powers that made
exercise of the enumerated powers more "convenient." Ultimately,
the Supreme Court sided with the latter camp, adopting a broad
interpretation of Congress' powers.142
In light of McCulloch, the discussion in the preceding section looks
like an issue of the scope of Congress' implied powers. The
enumerated power at issue is Congress' power to admit a state. The
implied power is Congress' power to address other matters related to
statehood. The question then is how closely related to statehood
those matters must be.
The preceding section provided a broad and narrow interpretation
of Congress' implied powers regarding statehood. The broad
interpretation was that Congress may make any law in anticipation of
statehood, and the narrow interpretation was that Congress may make
only laws absolutely necessary for statehood. McCulloch helps us
choose between these competing interpretations. The latter
interpretation is the argument made in McCulloch: that Congress has
only those implied powers absolutely necessary to the exercise of an
enumerated power. The McCulloch Court rejected that argument,
holding instead that Congress may enact all laws "convenient" or
"helpful" to the exercise of an enumerated power. It would be both
convenient and helpful for Congress to handle as many matters pre-
statehood as possible, eliminating the need for future legislation.
Thus, McCulloch supports the broader reading of Congress' pre-
statehood legislative power.
6. Coda
Once again, text proved unhelpful. The only insight came from the
absurdity principle, which helped frame the issue. If Congress could
have admitted Texas as five states, why not allow Congress to admit
one state with consent to future division? Next, we looked to other
sources of meaning. Structure showed that simultaneous admission
and consent to division promoted federalism values and accountable
government. Past government practice showed that Congress had in
fact addressed statehood matters in pre-statehood legislation. Judicial
precedent showed that Congress' power to address statehood matters
ought to be construed broadly. While hardly a resounding
141. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
142. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421-23.
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endorsement, the methods largely support Congress' power to pass
the five-state provision. As with the prior issue, text was useless
without the other methods.
C. Time Limit for Consent
Well, it appears as though the five-state provision was constitutional
when enacted. Now, the question presented is whether the Texas
legislature may still take Congress up on its offer. Put more generally,
are congressional and state legislative consent constitutionally valid to
divide a state when given over 150 years apart? This section uses our
five methods of interpretation to analyze this issue.
As we will see, the debate over the constitutionality of the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment will provide some arguments for
consideration.' Congress proposed that amendment in 1789, but the
last state did not ratify it until 1992.11 The question is whether the
Constitution limits the time between proposal and ratification. When
appropriate, we will consider arguments from that debate. 45
Before moving to the analysis proper, I must bracket an important
historical question. As the Civil War approached, several states,
Texas included, purportedly seceded from the United States. 46 After
the War, Congress seated representatives from each Confederate state
after the state ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. 47  Upon
secession, one could argue, the State of Texas no longer existed and,
thus, Congress' prior consent to division of the then-existing state of
Texas lapsed. Subsequently, when it re-admitted Texas, Congress did
not include another five-state provision with the re-admission.
Secession arguably terminated the five-state provision soon after it
went into effect.
143. U.S. Const. amend. XXVII ("No law, varying the compensation for the
services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of
Representatives shall have intervened."); see generally Richard B. Bernstein, The
Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61
Fordham L. Rev. 497 (1992) (reviewing the history behind Amendment XXVII,
including the controversies that existed over congressional compensation and the
public outcry which fueled the passing of the amendment, and what implications the
amendment has for the practice of "amendment politics"); Stewart Dalzell & Eric J.
Beste, Is the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 200 Years Too Late?, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
501 (1994) (arguing "that the theoretical underpinnings of the Constitution requires
that some element of timeliness be included" in the Article V process in order to
"give effect to the 'will of the people"'); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of
Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L.J.
677 (1993).
144. Levinson, supra note 9, at 102.
145. I rely heavily upon Professor Levinson's account of the debate in id.
146. An Ordinance to Dissolve the Union Between the State of Texas and the
Other States, United Under the Compact Styled "The Constitution of the United
States of America" (Feb. 1, 1861), The Avalon Project at the Yale Law School,
available at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/texanO3.htm>.
147. See Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 70, at 110-13.
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Devotees of President Abraham Lincoln's constitutional
jurisprudence could save the five-state provision from the secession
argument. From the beginning, Lincoln maintained that a state could
not secede from the Union-it made no logical sense.'4 Under this
view, Texas was temporarily at odds with its fellow states but never
legally left the Union. Because secession never legally occurred, it
cannot bar application of the five-state provision.
I do not choose between these competing views of secession-it is
outside the scope of this project, and it has been discussed extensively
elsewhere. Besides, in Texas v. White,49 a case decided during
Reconstruction, the Supreme Court explained that the Union is an
"indissoluble relation;" the southern states could not secede." The
Court repeated this explanation only forty years ago in United States
v. Louisiana.' These judicial pronouncements further minimize the
secession objection.
1. Text
If text seemed opaque on the last question, it is a virtual black hole
on this question, yielding no light at all. The problem ultimately lies
in the absence of text-the Statehood Clause does not say anything
about time limits one way or the other. Equally plausible
explanations exist for this textual silence, and each explanation
suggests an opposite result. Text alone provides no basis for choosing.
The first argument from the text's silence runs as follows: the
Statehood Clause does not place any time limit on consent, so division
occurs whenever Congress and a state consent, regardless of the
intervening time. Professor Laurence Tribe has made a similar
argument regarding a time limit for ratification of a constitutional
amendment under Article V.1 Article V simply requires
congressional proposal and state ratification, with no time limit
specified. According to Professor Tribe, textual silence is conclusive;
if the drafters wanted a time limit, they would have included one. 5 '
148. See Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Final Text) (Mar. 4, 1861), in
IV The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 262, 264-65 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953);
Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in id. at 432-
41. For legal commentary on the issue of secession, see generally, C. Lloyd Brown-
John, Self-determination, Autonomy and State Secession in Federal Constitutional and
International Law, 40 S. Tex. L. Rev. 567 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism
and Secession, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 633 (1991); cf Reference re: Secession of Quebec,
[1998] S.C.R. 217 (holding that province of Quebec did not have power to unilaterally
secede from Canada).
149. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
150. Id. at 726.
151. 363 U.S. 1, 42-43 n.83 (1960).
152. 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 1-19, at 102 (3d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter Tribe, ACL]; Laurence H. Tribe, The Twenty-Seventh Amendment Joins
the Constitution, Wall St. J., May 13, 1992, at A15.
153. Tribe, ACL, supra note 152, § 1-19, at 102.
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Professor Tribe's argument relies on a view of how people
ordinarily use language. Specifically, he assumes that the ordinary
drafter would include a time limit if intended, rather than assume that
such a limit is implied. But why does his assumption better reflect
ordinary legal usage than the contrary one? Contemporary law
contains illustrative counter-examples." 4 Some federal statutes do not
contain a statute of limitations, but textual silence has not stopped the
Supreme Court from inferring such a time limit.15 5  Similarly, the
common law doctrine of laches may bar assertion of rights even when
no applicable statute of limitations exists.1 56 Under contract law, even
if an offer does not contain a time limit, courts infer a reasonable time
limit on acceptance.157 Similarly, inherent in the concept of due
process is a timely resolution of controversies. 58 Given the ubiquity
of implied legal time limits, Professor Tribe's confidence in textual
silence is puzzling.
Even if Professor Tribe could persuade us that his assumption
reflects contemporary ordinary legal usage, that still does not
determine how ordinary legal drafters used language at the time of the
founding. As discussed in Part II.A, rules of grammar have changed
over time. 59 How much confidence do we have that drafting
conventions have remained constant over the last two hundred
years?16°
While ordinary legal usage may not lend support, Professor Tribe's
argument finds intratextual support, as the Constitution sets forth
time limits in several places. For example, the Constitution prohibited
Congress from abolishing the slave trade for twenty years' 6' and
154. See Levinson, supra note 9, at 104-05 (discussing letter from Professor Paul
Gewirtz to Senator Paul Simon that made this argument regarding validity of the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment).
155. See, e.g., Donald J. Polden, Drawing the Appropriate Statute of Limitations in
Implied Causes of Action Under Rule lOb-5: A General Framework of Familiar Legal
Principles, 40 Drake L. Rev. 221, 224-27 (1991) (discussing role of courts in implying
statute of limitations for federal statutes with no express limitation).
156. Ashraf Ray Ibrahim, Note, The Doctrine of Laches in International Law, 83
Va. L. Rev. 647, 647-48 (1997).
157. Dalzell & Beste, supra note 143, at 523-26 (arguing that because the
Constitution is a social compact, Article V amendment process ought to be
interpreted consistent with contract interpretation principles); Grover Rees III,
Throwing Away the Key: The Unconstitutionality of the Equal Rights Amendment
Extension, 58 Tex. L. Rev. 875, 880 n.20 (1980) (arguing that Article V proposal and
ratification of constitutional amendment is analogous to offer and acceptance of
contract); see Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 35, 36(1)(b) (1981). But see
Paulsen, supra note 143, at 705-06 (criticizing the "contract model" of Article V).
158. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 10-7, at 664 (2d ed.
1988).
159. See supra notes 44-79 and accompanying text.
160. Cf Nelson, supra note 59, at 298-303 (explaining how Supreme Court's
current preemption doctrines fail to understand the text of the Supremacy Clause,
which incorporates statutory drafting conventions from the founding).
161. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9 ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any
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prohibited constitutional amendments that would allow Congress to
do so;162 limits military appropriations to two years;lt3 places a ten-day
limit on the president's power to sign or veto a bill;"b and limits the
terms of office of representatives and senators.1  The drafters
included time limits when they wanted them, implying that omission
of a time limit was not accidental. This observation is akin to the
statutory interpretation canon expressio unius exclusio alterius: the
inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of others.'
The problem with canons is that they are not immutable laws of
nature. Rather, as with Professor Tribe's assumption, they are meant
to reflect ordinary usage of language. Consequently, evidence of
contrary usage can overcome the canon's presumption. And, as noted
above, the law often infers time limits despite textual silence. So,
textual arguments yield a draw: we have equal reasons to draw
opposite inferences from textual silence.
2. History
As with the prior issue, history does not shed any light. The only
debate over division of a state concerned whether Congress could do
so without a state's consent.167 As the Statehood Clause reflects, the
Convention decided in favor of state sovereignty by requiring a state's
consent. Neither answer to our present question-time limit, or no
time limit-better serves state sovereignty. Either way, a state cannot
be divided without its consent, which was the main concern behind the
consent provision. How long states have to consent, if they choose to
do so, is merely a collateral matter.
3. Structure
The constitutional structure of federalism offers support, albeit
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight ....").
162. Id. art. V ("[N]o Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One
thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article ....").
163. Id art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (stating that Congress has the power "[tbo raise and
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer
Term than two Years").
164. Id art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within
ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall
be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their
Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.").
165. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States."); id. § 3, cl. 1
("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State,
chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years ....").
166. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 323 (1994).
167. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
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weak, for no time limit. Recall from the discussion above that an
important federalism principle is that state governments ought to
control local matters."6 That discussion concluded that the question
whether to divide is laden with many local concerns best decided at
the state level. Similarly, the question when a state should divide is a
local matter. Perhaps a state is best governed as a single unit during
the early stages of its development, but division becomes appropriate
when several urban centers, with diverse regional identities, emerge
within the state. The state government, with ground-level
representation from all corners of the state, is best situated to gauge
when division becomes appropriate.
Conversely, the democratic structure of accountability offers weak
support for a time limit. Proponents of a time limit on ratification of
constitutional amendments made a similar argument. Constitutional
amendments respond to a felt need to change a fundamental aspect of
American government. The two-step ratification process-
congressional proposal followed by state ratification-is structured to
gauge whether a contemporary consensus exists on the proposed
amendment. If ratification is strung out over too long a time period,
we have no confidence that a sufficiently contemporary consensus
ever existed. All we know is that a variety of isolated groups at
different periods of time felt the same passion. Isolated, sporadic
passions are not the stuff of constitutional change.169 Democratic
legitimacy requires some time limit on the process.
The same argument could be made for congressional and state
consent to division of a state. The two-step process of congressional
and state consent is meant to gauge whether there is contemporary
national and local support for division. Congress determines whether
division is in the national interest, considering both the contemporary
needs of other states and the nation as a whole. The state to be
divided determines whether division is in its interest. A time limit
would ensure that the national-local consensus co-exists. Otherwise,
significant passage of time might change the circumstances that
formed the basis of Congress' consent. In that case, the later state
consent would no longer reflect a contemporaneous national-local
consensus. Rather, it would represent the self-interested decision of
one state that has an effect on the entire nation. Allowing one state to
impose its will on all others violates the structural principle of
democratic accountability. 170
168. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
169. See Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 70, at 389-92 (describing the
failed constitutional moment of the Reagan era).
170. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that a state
cannot tax the national bank because that would allow the state to effectively tax the
rest of the nation).
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As with text, the structure argument is a standoff. Federalism
arguments tilt toward no time limit, while democratic accountability
arguments tilt toward a time limit. We thus move on to past
government practice with the analysis in a constitutional dead heat.
4. Past Government Practice
The First Congress admitted two states by dividing an existing
state:171  Kentucky, by dividing Virginia, and Vermont, by dividing
New York.17 Both cases followed a three-part pattern: (1) the state
to be divided consented to division, (2) the territory to be admitted
applied to Congress for admission, and (3) Congress admitted the new
state.173 Also, in each case, the entire process occurred within the span
of no more than two years.
The five-state provision differs from the Kentucky-Vermont pattern
in two important respects. First, Congress' consent came first, not
last. Second, over 150 years later, the process is still not complete. So,
on the surface, the five-state provision does not fit with past practice
on dividing states.
Next, we need to ask whether the Kentucky-Vermont pattern of
admission reflects some deeper constitutional meaning, or whether it
is nothing more than the product of specific circumstances. Were
171. As noted above, Congress also admitted Maine by dividing Massachusetts. I
exclude Maine from the textual discussion for two reasons. First, because Maine was
not admitted by the First Congress (Maine was admitted in 1820), its admission is not
as persuasive evidence of the Framers' meaning as Kentucky and Vermont. See supra
notes 114-118 and accompanying text. Second, and perhaps more important, in
admitting Maine, Congress followed the same pattern as in admitting Kentucky and
Vermont, and thus Maine does not add anything new to the analysis. See Act of Mar.
3, 1820, ch. 19, 16th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 Stat. 544 (admitting Maine to the Union with
Massachusetts' prior consent).
Arguably, West Virginia supplies a fourth case of prior government practice, as that
state was formerly a part of Virginia. The dubious constitutionality of West Virginia's
admission to the Union, however, makes it ill-suited to serve as constitutional
precedent. See J.G. Randall & David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction 236-
42 (2d ed. 1961). The Virginia "legislature" that consented to West Virginia's
admission was a Union-recognized group of dissident Virginians, as the state's pre-
Civil War legislature had seceded from the Union. Using the Supreme Court's logic
regarding other constitutional irregularities of that period, such constitutional issues
were settled by the war, and we ought not inquire into them today. Testa v. Katt, 330
U.S. 386,390 (1947) ("[T]he fundamental issues over the extent of federal supremacy
had been resolved by war."). Given that the Texas five-state provision was not a war
time measure, West Virginia's admission offers little support or guidance.
172. As noted above, proponents of Vermont statehood did not concede New
York's claim that Vermont was within its jurisdiction. See supra note 116. But,
because New York consented to Vermont's statehood, the question never required
resolution. Thus, without resolving the question of New York's rights, we can treat
Vermont as a case where at least some of the actors viewed the matter as involving
division of a state. Since Vermont followed the same pattern as Kentucky, Vermont
merely supports whatever precedent Kentucky establishes.
173. See Currie, supra note 114, at 837-40.
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Kentucky and Vermont admitted as they were because those involved
believed the Constitution required that method of proceeding? Or,
was that method merely the most logical under the circumstances,
even though the Constitution allowed other methods?
History advises against reading too much into the Kentucky and
Vermont admissions. Both Kentucky and Vermont petitioned for
admission during Congress' first session, when that body was
preoccupied with establishing the new national government; initiating
admission of new states was not a priority. As mentioned above, the
drafting and ratifying conventions worried that Congress' power to
divide a state might threaten state sovereignty. Consequently, the
Constitution prohibits Congress from dividing a state without its
consent. Given this concern about federal power, it seems unlikely
that the first Congress would have taken the initiative, even if
constitutionally permissible, in dividing an existing state. Better to let
the states make the first move, than to provoke an early debate over
Congress' abuse of the states.
The historical context of the five-state provision stands in stark
contrast to that of Kentucky and Vermont. First, unlike Kentucky
and Vermont, Texas fit logically within the contemporary
congressional agenda. Slavery was an important contemporary issue,
and Texas' annexation figured prominently in that debate. Second, at
the time the five-state provision was proposed, Texas was not an
existing state. By proposing future division of Texas, Congress was
not threatening the sovereignty of an existing state. Indeed, several
existing states saw it to their advantage to have as many as five new
slave states on their side in the Senate. These differences may explain
why the five-state provision quite logically followed a different pattern
than Kentucky and Vermont.
Kentucky and Vermont therefore do not tell us anything relevant
about the meaning of the Statehood Clause. Once again, the problem
with past government practice is that it is unknown why the past
practice was followed. Specifically, why were Vermont and Kentucky
admitted as they were? Without a rationale for Congress' practice, it
is impossible to know what lessons, if any, that practice holds for other
cases. Also, we do not know whether the differences between
admission of Vermont and Kentucky, on the one hand, and the five-
state provision, on the other hand, are more important than their
similarities. Proper analogies require the reasons behind decisions,
and past government practices are often silent on that score.
Perhaps a non-statehood government practice can help here.
Again, consider the case of amending the Constitution. In some
instances, Congress has included a time limit for ratification of a
proposed amendment. For example, Congress placed a seven-year
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limit on ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment.'74
One might infer that Congress did so because it believed Article V
otherwise imposed no time limit. Further, Congress has expressly
approved ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, which was
proposed in 1789 and ratified in 1992. Again, Congress acted as if
Article V established no time limit on the amendment process.
On the surface, the analogy to state division would be that there is
no time limit on the division process unless Congress establishes one
in consenting to division of a state. For example, Congress could have
consented to the future division of Texas, but only if the state
legislature did so within ten years. Since Congress did not include a
time limit in the five-state provision, and the Constitution does not
impose one, Texas may still divide itself.
The problem with this analogy to the amendment process is that it
really begs the question: Are Congress' actions in the amendment
process probative of the meaning of the state-division process? This
issue raises many further questions that have no answers. Why did
Congress include time limits in some, but not all, amendments? Did
Congress believe there was no time limit on ratification? Or, did
Congress believe that the time limits set forth for some amendments
were shorter than the constitutional time limit for ratification? Was
Congress' acceptance of ratification of the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment a constitutional decision, or, as some have suggested,
mere political expedience?17 1 Can we even attribute a consistent
approach to different Congresses over time? Even if Congress did
believe there was no time limit on ratification, what was the reason for
this belief? Are the reasons unique to the amending process? If not,
do those reasons apply to the state-division process? These
unanswered questions once again illustrate that past government
practices often offer only weak analytical direction.
Once again, we are left without much guidance. History provides
two instances of state division, yet it is unclear how they should be
understood. Also, analogy to the amendment process raises more
questions than it answers. So, with our issue still in doubt, we move to
the final method of interpretation-judicial precedent.
5. Precedent
No judicial precedent addresses time frames under any aspect of the
Statehood Clause, including division of a state. Again, however, one
can analogize the division of a state to the amendment process, where
Supreme Court dicta supports a time limit on ratification. In Dillon '.
174. See Rees, supra note 157, at 880 n.19. Congress later extended the ratification
deadline. See id.
175. See Levinson, supra note 9, at 106-07.
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Gloss,176  the Court reviewed proposal of the Eighteenth
Amendment.177  In the resolution proposing that amendment,
Congress for the first time set a time limit on ratification- seven
years. 78 The Court upheld Congress' power to impose a time limit,
relying on its conclusion that Article V implicitly requires ratification
within a reasonable time.179 If the Constitution requires ratification
within an unspecified reasonable time period, Congress certainly has
power to specify the time period for a given amendment. 80
The Court offered three reasons for construing Article V to require
ratification within a reasonable time period:
First, proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts but
as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being
that they are not to be widely separated in time. Secondly, it is only
when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments
are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being that when
proposed they are to be considered and disposed of presently.
Thirdly, as ratification is but the expression of the approbation of
the people and is to be effective when had in three-fourths of the
States, there is a fair implication that it must be sufficiently
contemporaneous in that number of States to reflect the will of the
people in all sections at relatively the same period, which of course
ratification scattered through a long series of years would not do.'
8
'
Proposal and ratification must occur together in time because the
amendment process (1) is a "single endeavor," (2) that responds to a
current "necessity," and (3) is meant to gauge a "contemporary"
consensus. Our question is whether these three principles also apply
to the statehood process. Consider each principle in turn.
First, the steps of congressional and state consent to division are a
"single endeavor." Both consents have a single focus and purpose-to
176. 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
177. Id. at 370-77. The Eighteenth Amendment states:
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the
importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States
and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is
hereby prohibited.
Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified
as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several
States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of
the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.
U.S. Const. amend. XVIII.
178. S.J. Res. 17, 65th Cong., 2nd Sess., 40 Stat. 1050 (1917).
179. Dillon, 256 U.S. at 375 ("We conclude that the fair inference or implication
from Article V is that the ratification must be within some reasonable time after the
proposal.").
180. Id. at 375-76.
181. Id- at 374-75.
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divide an existing state into two or more states. These actions do not
serve any collateral function that might consist of another "endeavor."
Thus, under the reasoning in Dillon, "the natural inference" is that
state and congressional consent "are not to be widely separated in
time."
Second, unlike a constitutional amendment, admission of a state
does not always respond to a current necessity. Most amendments, as
well as the Constitution itself, have responded to existing problems
that required immediate solutions." The Constitution addressed the
serious problems posed by a weak central government that had no
power to tax or to regulate interstate commerce." The Bill of Rights
responded to the call of many state ratifying conventions to protect
individuals and the states from the new national government." The
Eleventh Amendment, withdrawing federal court jurisdiction over
diversity suits brought against states, responded to a Supreme Court
decision that threatened states with crippling litigation." And the list
goes on. With the exception of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment,
every amendment proposed without a time limitation has been
ratified within four years.'86 Thus, our experience has been that
amendments by their nature respond to needs of the times, and are
ratified while the need is extant.
By contrast, the decision to admit a state may or may not involve a
response to necessity. During the nation's first century, acquisition of
new territories served the United States' immediate commercial and
military interests. In addition, just prior to the Civil War, the North
and South saw some urgency in admitting new states on their side of
the slavery controversy."8 As the Twentieth Century illustrates,
however, admission of a state is not always a matter of perceived
necessity. For example, Alaska statehood took ninety-two years,'
182. See Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 58 (1993)
("[E]very amendment beginning with the Eleventh has been framed with a very
specific object, in response to what was seen as a substantive need.").
183. The Federalist No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing flaws in government
under the Articles of Confederation that led to drafting of the Constitution).
184. Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 182, at 58-62.
185. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
186. See Dalzell & Beste, supra note 143, at 524.
187. For example, the Lincoln Administration recognized the severance of a pro-
North section of Virginia as the new state of West Virginia. See Randall & Donald,
supra note 171, at 236-42. According to President Lincoln, admission of West
Virginia was "expedient" under the circumstances of the Civil War. Abraham
Lincoln, Opinion on the Admission of West Virginia into the Union (Dec. 31, 1862),
in VI The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, supra note 148, at 27; see also
Walter Dean Burnham, Constitutional Moments and Punctuated Equilibria: A
Political Scientist Confronts Bruce Ackerman's We the People, 108 Yale LI. 2237,
2263 n.47 (1999) (describing the admission of West Virginia as "full of procedural
irregularities").
188. Alaska was a district from 1867 to 1912, and then an organized territory from
1912 until statehood in 1959. See http:I/www.50states.comstatehood.htm.
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and Hawaii statehood took sixty-one years. 18 9 The territory of Puerto
Rico has debated statehood for many years.190 The lesson of history is
that statehood can be the product of necessity, but is not inherently
SO.
Third, unlike the amendment process, the statehood process is not
designed to gauge a contemporary consensus. Consider two
differences between the two processes. To begin with, the
amendment process requires super-majority votes in both houses of
Congress as well as a super-majority of state ratifications.19' The
Statehood Clause, by contrast, does not specify the vote required for
admission or division of a state, presumably allowing a simple
majority vote.192 Another difference is that to gauge whether broad-
based national support exists, Article V requires submission of a
proposed amendment to all states. Conversely, to divide an existing
state, Congress needs only the consent of the state to be divided.
Consequently, by seeking super-majority approval from a wider
constituency, the amendment process is uniquely designed to seek a
contemporary consensus.
On the whole, the three Dillon factors provide weak support for a
time limit on state division. Division can be characterized as a single
endeavor, but that factor itself is fairly weak. Many activities can be
described as a "single endeavor," yet take place over a long period of
time. Indeed, the Constitution itself could be described as a single
endeavor in republican government. The other two factors-necessity
and contemporary consensus-fit poorly with the Statehood Clause.
The analogy to Dillon does not help this analysis. Further, the
Dillon factors are technically dicta because the issue whether the
Constitution imposes a time limit was not before the Court.
Subsequent to deciding Dillon, the Court held in Coleman v. Miller19 3
189. Hawaii was an United States territory from its acquisition in 1898 until
statehood in 1959. See id.
190. Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States by Spain in 1898 and remains a
territory today. On statehood efforts, see http://www.puertorico51.org/library/
libraryjbody.htn.
191. Article V states:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution,... which... shall be valid
to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Convention in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress.
U.S. Const. art. V. The Constitution also provides for amendment when two-thirds of
the states call a convention for that purpose. Id. As no proposed amendment has
followed this route, I focus on the other method here.
192. Cf Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 Duke L.J.
73, 74-75 (1996) (addressing the argument that because the Constitution does not
establish a vote required to "pass" a bill, Congress has discretion to set a vote level by
rule).
193. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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that aspects of the amendment process pose non-justiciable political
questions.194 Thus, we can expect no further elaboration on Dillon.
For all of these reasons, Dillon, our only tangentially relevant judicial
precedent, does not assist in our analysis of this question.
6. Coda
Our analysis has hit a dead end. Text allows opposite inferences.
History is silent. Structure pulls both ways. Past government practice
is too sparse to yield guidance. Four square precedent does not exist,
and the only loosely analogous precedent is not supportive.
So, if you were charged with deciding the issue, how would you
answer? One option would be to pick the outcome you find more
appropriate (on whatever basis you choose), and then comb the
preceding discussion for bits and pieces of analysis that support that
outcome. Another option would be to appeal to some extra-
constitutional principle. For example, a federal judge might follow
the principle that federal judges ought to uphold any government
action unless the Constitution, as interpreted using the methods
employed above, forbids that action. Either way, it will not be the
methods dictating the result. Rather, something outside the methods,
and thus outside the Constitution, will drive the answer.
III. LESSONS LEARNED ALONG THE WAY
We have completed our journey through three constitutional issues,
bringing the methods of interpretation to bear on each. It is now time
to evaluate the teachings of this case study. The next section draws
four lessons about the methods from the case study. The final section
then turns to lessons about constitutional interpretation generally,
offering a typology of constitutional issues.
A. Lessons About Constitutional Method
Lesson 1: There is No Such Thing as Textualism
In our case study, text alone did not even suggest an answer to any
194. Id at 447-56; see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1993)
(stating that what it means for the Senate to "try" an impeachment is a political
question committed to the discretion of the Senate), Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 548-49 (1969) (concluding that the propriety of the House's refusal to seat a
member for lack of qualifications was not a political question); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 226-27, 237 (1962) (deciding that whether state legislative apportionment
that did not proportionally reflect the state's population violated the Equal Protection
Clause was not a political question); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939)
(determining that issues concerning the amendment process are political questions
committed to discretion of Congress).
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of the three central questions. 95 This is remarkable, especially given
that the first issue proved to be quite easy after consulting the other
methods. In sum, text was a non-factor.
It should not be surprising that text is so unhelpful. Text consists of
language, and language does not have intrinsic meaning.9 6 Language
is not a vessel that holds meaning; it is a tool used to convey
meaning.1 97 At its core, language is a social practice that has meaning
only within a group that engages in the practice.1 98 It is the practices
surrounding language that allow it to have meaning, not vice versa.
For example, nothing inherent in the letter combination "hat" makes
it a word that has meaning, as opposed to the letter combination
"flirexty."'199 We (those who speak a common language) simply use
"hat" in ways we recognize; shared usage allows us to communicate
and, on average, understand one another. Indeed, someday we may
use "flirexty" as part of our language, or we may not. Whether we do
so does not depend on anything inherent in those letters. Rather, it
depends on our social practices.
To make matters worse, different groups who speak the same
language may nonetheless use words in different ways."' For
example, at times, lawyers use the word "consideration" differently
from non-lawyers. So, if someone says, "Did you give Ann
consideration?," it would be helpful to know whether the speaker is a
lawyer.
Language is a practice, and therefore it is really a mistake to speak
of "plain text," as if the text itself imparts meaning.21' Text is only a
symbol that draws upon larger social understandings, assumptions,
and practices that lie outside text. Text may point us in a direction,
195. See supra notes 44-79, 119-121, 152-166 and accompanying text.
196. See Gerald Graff, "Keep Off the Grass, " "Drop Dead," and Other
Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 405,405-06 (1982).
197. Id. at 406 (rejecting the conception that "meaning is a substance or spirit
reposing in language" (emphasis omitted)).
198. See Gene Anne Smith, Wittgenstein and the Sceptical Fallacy, in Wittgenstein
and Legal Theory 157 (Dennis M. Patterson ed., 1992). Smith explains that:
[LIanguage is a practice, a technique, that we learn. It depends upon a given
community of understanding and established practices, to be sure. But this
is required not in order to verify my judgments. It is required to give the
context in which I can make meaningful judgments at all.
Id. at 179 (emphasis omitted).
199. Graff, supra note 196, at 405 ("[W]ords by which we signify 'tables' and
'chairs' are only somewhat arbitrary sounds .... ).
200. Id. at 407-08 (noting that the command "Keep off the grass," will mean
something different depending on whether it is spoken by a gardener or a narcotics-
counselor).
201. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Principles, Not Fictions, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1247, 1247
(1990) ("[Tlhe culture furnishes the interpretive principles that courts and other
interpreters use in order to give meaning to any 'text.' Legal words are never
susceptible to interpretation standing by themselves, and in any case they never stand
by themselves.").
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but it is the understandings, assumptions, and practices that convey
meaning. When we claim to interpret text, we are putting those
understandings, assumptions, and practices into action. Perhaps this
explains the phenomenon, noted by other commentators, that
constitutional interpretation goes on quite often without resort to the
Constitution's text.2' Text is merely the symbolic representation,
often imperfect, of choices, decisions, and ideas that constitute the
Constitution. Text merely reminds us of these choices, decisions, and
ideas which, once brought into view, do the real work in the
constitutional interpretation.
So, as most textualists admit, for text to be helpful, one must open
the door to context.2 3 Once one does so, however, the question
becomes which aspects of context should be invited into the analysis?
At the very least, we must know how people who speak that language
use the words at issue, but words often have many usages, so we must
choose which usage is most appropriate. This choice viil cause
further resort to context, and yet, even when we believe we have a
proper usage in mind, that usage may not answer our interpretive
question.
To see these aspects of textualism, consider a portion of the
Constitution's text that most commentators see as posing little
interpretive difficulty: "No Person... shall be eligible to the Office of
President... who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five
Years .... ,2I Admittedly, the Clause seems straightforward, and in
most cases it is easy to apply. But why? It is not the words
themselves. To prove this, let's play some games with the words. The
accepted meaning of the clause is that a person must reach a
chronological age of thirty-five to be eligible for president. But, why
not interpret the clause to simply require a level of maturity-that of a
person approaching middle age-with the electorate as the judge of
that qualification? For example, dictionaries list one usage of the
word "age" as, "a certain period of human life, as infancy, youth,
manhood, and old age; the age of youth; the age of manhood.""°
Under this usage, "age of thirty five years" is just a way of saying "age
of mature judgment."2'
202. See David A. Strauss, The New Textualism in Constitutional Law, 66 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1153, 1153-54 (1998); David A. Strauss, Cominon Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877,879 (1996).
203. See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
23-24 (1997); see also Smith, supra note 47, at 28-29.
204. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
205. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary 35 (2d. ed. 1978).
206. Judge Frank Easterbrook offers other possible interpretations of the clause:
When the Constitution says the President must be thirty-five years old, we
cannot be certain whether it means thirty-five as the number of revolutions
of the world around the sun, as a percentage of average life expectancy (so
that the Constitution now has age fifty as a minimum), or as a minimum
number of years after puberty (so the minimum now is thirty or so).
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As you read the last paragraph, your gut told you, "I know that 'age
of thirty-five years' means chronological age and not some less-
defined period of life.' '2° But, how do you know this? Text does not
tell you. Rather, it is the way we use such time limits throughout
society. You cannot drive until you are sixteen years of age; you
cannot vote until eighteen years of age; you cannot drink until twenty-
one years of age. We use age limits in many areas of life, and, when
we do so, our practice is to require chronological age. Indeed, we may
make exceptions for people who are not of the requisite chronological
age but nonetheless seem eligible. Our practice, however, is to treat
these cases as exceptions because we use the age qualification to mean
chronological age.2°
Other portions of the Constitution reflect this practice. Article I
sets forth age requirements for representatives (twenty-five) and
senators (thirty).209 Generally, we do not see twenty-five, thirty, and
thirty-five as marking vastly different periods in a person's life, and we
are therefore inclined to read the Constitution as referring to
chronological age. Again, however, it is not the language of the three
time limits that drives this conclusion. Rather, it is our understanding
of social practices, such as the major milestones that mark a person's
life.210
Consequently, easy questions are easy because they draw upon
usual, accepted practices, not because the language is somehow itself
plain or clear.211 Text merely invokes those practices, and then the
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 536 (1983). 1 would
dispute, however, that "we cannot be certain" that the clause requires chronological
age. As discussed next, our practice of using chronological age for legal age limits
allows us to be "certain"-or, as "certain" as we can be about language use-about
how to apply the clause. See infra notes 207-17 and accompanying text.
207. A similar, obviously incorrect, argument would be that "thirty-five" should be
read in base eight, which would yield an age of twenty-four in base ten. See Laurence
H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method ini
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1223, 1224 (1995).
208. Similarly, our practice is to state age limits in base ten, the same method we
use to express chronological age in daily life.
209. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; § 3, cl. 3.
210. Thus, it should be no surprise that intratextualism may sometimes fail. For
example, in Part II.A, we saw that intratextualism misdirected our analysis. Our
comparison of the Statehood Clause to Article I, § 10 supported the reading that state
division was not allowed. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text. All other
interpretive evidence, however, pointed to the opposite conclusion. This instance
supports those commentators who urge caution in adopting intratextualism's
integrated vision of the Constitution.
211. One commentator states:
Though we can say that certain utterances "normally" are used to mean one
thing rather than others they might potentially be used to mean (and it's
such normal expectations that enable us to make educated guesses of what is
meant in particular cases), this fact itself demonstrates that interpretation is
concerned not with what words or sentences mean "in themselves" but with
how speakers actualize the semantic potential of words and utterances in
particular speech acts.
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practices do the interpretive work. To see this consider a difficult
question raised by the thirty-five-year age requirement. Suppose a
candidate for president has a birth certificate that fixes her age at 34,
but the hospital birth records fix her age at 35. One record is
obviously mistaken. Which record do we credit? What are the
criteria for deciding? Who should decide? Our seemingly obvious
text is ambiguous on these issues, not because the words have become
less plain in meaning, but rather because no practice surrounding
these words addresses these questions.
The same could be said for other questions under the presidential
age requirement. For example, must any person who holds an office
that succeeds to the presidency upon death of the president be thirty-
five years old?212 For, if the person is not "eligible" for the presidency,
how can they be placed in the line of succession? Under the
unamended Constitution, must the Vice President have been thirty-
five years old? 13 Was there even a minimum age requirement for
Vice President? The Vice President is President of the Senate, t and
senators need only be thirty years old.2 5 But, the Vice President is
Graff, supra note 196, at 408; see also Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally:
Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies 358
(1989) ("A meaning that seems to leap off the page, propelled by its own self-
sufficiency, is a meaning that flows from interpretive assumptions so deeply
embedded that they have become invisible."); Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of
Postrnodern Jurisprudence, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 166, 179 (1996) ("[E]ven when one does
not deliberate consciously about the meaning of the text, but rather appears to grasp
its meaning immediately, that immediate grasp is possible only because the individual
is situated within a horizon constituted by traditions and prejudices.").
212. Congress has provided for the following line of succession in the event that
neither the President nor the Vice President can fulfill their duties: Speaker of the
House of Representatives, President pro tempore of the Senate, Secretary of State,
Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the
Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor,
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of
Education, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. 3 U.S.C.A. § 19 (West 1997). Congress
derives this power from the Succession Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 5. See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential
Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 113 (1995) (arguing that the
presidential succession law violates the Constitution's requirement that an "Officer"
be appointed to replace the President by placing the Speaker of the House and the
President pro tempore of the Senate in the line of succession). Our practice seems to
be that a person need not be eligible to be President to hold an office in the line of
succession. A recent example is former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
Secretary Albright is not a natural born United States citizen, and thus is not eligible
to be President, but she held the office third in the presidential line of succession after
the Vice President.
213. Today, the Twelfth Amendment provides that "no person constitutionally
ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the
United States." U.S. Const. amend. XII.
214. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
215. Id. cl. 3.
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not a "senator '216 and has no vote unless the Senate is "equally
divided. '217  Text offers no answers here, not because the words
themselves are not clear, but rather because no practice or
understanding surrounding the words provides guidance.
A further example of how practice, not text, determines meaning
can be found in the textualists' poster child for plain meaning-the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides, "No State shall... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."2 '
Due process textualists, like Justice Antonin Scalia and Professor
John Hart Ely, argue that the plain language of these clauses preclude
a doctrine of substantive due process. Scalia writes:
By its inescapable terms, [the Due Process Clause] guarantees only
process. Property can be taken by the state; liberty can be taken;
even life can be taken; but not without the process that our
traditions require-notably, a validly enacted law and a fair trial. To
say otherwise is to abandon textualism, and to render democratically
adopted texts mere springboards for judicial lawmaking.219
Ely makes the point more colorfully: "'substantive due process' is a
contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness.' ' 220 The
basic point is that "process" is the opposite of "substantive," thus a
due process clause is about procedure, not substance.
The Scalia-Ely argument makes sense to a lawyer reared in the
post-Erie, post-Legal Process world. Since Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,221 lawyers have been taught to distinguish between
substantive and procedural law in federal court diversity cases.
Similarly, "the major theme" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which came into effect in 1938, the same year the Court decided Erie,
"was that procedure should step aside and not interfere with
substance. ' 222 Further, the Legal Process school of thought, most
closely associated with Harvard Professors Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks, argued that legal legitimacy could be grounded on fair
procedures, separate from the applicable substantive law.2 For the
216. Id. cl. 1 ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
from each State .....
217. Id. cl. 4.
218. Id. amend. XIV. The Fifth Amendment is identical, except written in the
passive voice.
219. Scalia, supra note 203, at 24-25 (emphasis in original).
220. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 18
(1980).
221. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
222. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909, 973 (1987).
223. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sachs, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in
the Making and Application of Law (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., rev. ed. 1994); see also Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and
Jurisprudence at Century's End 35 (1995) ("Legitimate legal decision making would
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modem lawyer, the practices and understandings that lie behind the
word "process" all point to rules concerning procedure, usually in
judicial proceedings. 4 It is these practices and understandings, not
the words "due process" themselves, that drive the Scalia-Ely
argument.
To see this point starkly, consider the historical argument of
Professor James W. Ely that "due process" was originally used to
connote both procedural and substantive restrictions on government
power.' Our Due Process Clauses are descendants of the "law of the
land" clause in the Magna Carta. -6 Over time, the colonies and then
the emerging state governments incorporated the "law of the land"
language into their charters and constitutions, with some changing the
language to "due process of law."' 7 The latter language ended up in
the Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Professor
James Ely argues that historical materials establish two usages of
language among founding era lawyers: first, "due process of law" was
used interchangeably with "law of the land;" and second, both phrases
were used to include procedural and substantive restrictions on
government power.3
Regardless of whether Professor James Ely is correct, his argument
illustrates the flaw in the Scalia-Ely textual argument. The Scalia-Ely
argument treats the word "process" as if it has some intrinsic meaning
apart from its use in the Constitution. Consider the following passage
from John Hart Ely's argument:
[T]here is simply no avoiding the fact that the word that follows
"due" is "process." No evidence exists that "process" meant
something different a century ago from what it does now-in fact as
I've indicated the historical record runs somewhat the other way-
and it should take more than occasional aberrational use to establish
that those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment had an eccentric
definition in mind. 229
Scalia and Ely, embedded in the post-Erie and Legal Process
understandings of modem lawyers, fixate on the word "process" and
allow their own intellectual baggage to imbue that word with
meaning." The full phrase "due process of law," however, may have
turn on process values, not substantive theory. Procedure provided the objective
process through which the law would achieve ethically desirable outcomes.").
224. Indeed, Ely seems to assume that "process" normally refers to judicial
proceedings, as he expressly notes when he wants to include political process within
his analysis. Ely, supra note 220, at 87.
225. James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in tile
Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 Const. Comment. 315,344-45 (1999).
226. Id. at 320-21.
227. Id. at 322-27.
228. Id. at 327-38.
229. Ely, supra note 220, at 18.
230. Cf Fish, supra note 211, at 196.
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historical practices and understandings behind it not reflected by
modern usage of the single word "process. '' "l Thus, while modern
(and perhaps founding era) lawyers may use the word "process,"
standing alone, to connote procedural matters, that does not mean
that the phrase "due process of law" must have been used the same
way. Language simply does not work that way. As Professor James
Ely argues, the full phrase "due process of law" may have a different
usage than the word "process" standing alone.
The Scalia-Ely argument, then, makes two mistakes. First, it does
not recognize that its procedure-only interpretation rests on practices
and understandings, not text alone. Second, and derived from the
first, they do not consider whether those living at the time of the
framing used the phrase "due process of law" differently than lawyers
use the word "process" today. Thus, the seemingly simple textual
refutation of substantive due process really illustrates that textualism
does not exist as a separate method.
Justice Hugo Black, another recognized textualist, made a similar
error in interpreting the First Amendment Establishment Clause.
That Clause provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion .... ,1 Black held the view that this
prohibition was absolute, and that the plain text required this
interpretation. He defended his view in the following terms:
I'll read you the part of the first amendment that caused me to say
there are absolutes in our Bill of Rights.... Now, if a man were to
say this to me out on the street, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion"- that's the first
amendment-I would think: Amen, Congress should pass no law.
Unless they just didn't know the meaning of words. That's what
they mean to me. Certainly they mean that literally. 33
Justice Black explains that the words of the First Amendment
standing alone, primarily the word "no," tell him that the First
Amendment states an absolute prohibition. The word "no," however,
cannot bear this interpretative burden. To understand why, consider
several uses of the word "no" that are less than absolute:
As his birthday approaches, a husband says to his wife, "No party
this year." The wife, knowing her husband has said the same thing
every year since they met, and that he has always enjoyed a birthday
party, infers that her husband's "no" is a false protestation. Call this a
"false no."'
231. Tribe, supra note 207, at 1297 n.247 (noting different usages of "due process"
at different times).
232. U.S. Const. amend. I.
233. Justice Black and the Bill of Rights, 9 Sw. U. L. Rev. 937, 938 (1977) (transcript
of CBS News interview).
234. Cf. Fish, supra note 211, at 180-96 (discussing ironic use of language).
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A doctor asks a patient if she has any allergies, and the patient
replies, "I have no allergies." The prudent doctor understands the
patient to mean, "I have no known allergies," because, without
extensive testing or exposure to potential allergens, the patient simply
cannot make an unqualified statement. Call this a "qualified no."
A person places a sign near the front door of their home that says,
"No solicitors." An approaching solicitor knows that this sign is a
statement of the homeowner's preference, but that no legal sanction
will attach to a violation of the preference. Call this a "requested no."
A city ordinance states: "No person shall operate a vehicle in a
public park. Violation of this ordinance shall be punishable by a fine
of no more than $1,000." The average citizen reads the ordinance as
prohibiting the described conduct. Call this a "proscriptive no."
The word "no" is used in many senses. 5 The applicable usage
depends on the circumstances under which the word is used and the
language conventions associated with those circumstances.2-
So, how does Black know that the First Amendment uses a
proscriptive no, and not the false, qualified, or requested no? The
answer is not encoded in the word "no." Rather, it is the
circumstances under which he encounters the word -application of a
legal document that grants and limits government power-as well as
the practices concerning how such documents operate, that yield the
relevant meaning of "no." 7 And, even if practice specifies that the
First Amendment be read to state a proscriptive no, it is not at all
clear that our practice is to read a "proscriptive no" as an absolute
prohibition. For example, in the case of the city ordinance set forth
above, few would apply the prohibition to an ambulance that came to
235. A painful reminder of this fact can be found in the rape context, where male
assailants have used the "'no' didn't really mean no" argument to rationalize their
violent violation of women. See Susan Estrich, Real Rape 5 (1987).
236. See Marie McGinn, Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations 59
(1997) (explaining "Wittgenstein's idea that the structure and function of language
are revealed only in situ, when it is embedded in the active lives of those who speak
it"); Feldman, supra note 211, at 180-81 (stating that understanding, interpretation,
and application of text can only take place in a concrete setting). One commentator
explains this point in the context of the "no vehicles in the park" ordinance: "We are
not just talking about parks and vehicles here; we are talking about parks and vehicles
in a legal rule in a legal system in a particular culture." Pierre Schlag, No Vehicles in
the Park, 23 Seattle U. L. Rev. 381, 387 (1999).
237. McGinn, supra note 236, at 59 ("[It is the structures and distinctions that are
revealed in our actual use of language, and not those that remain when language is
abstracted from its application, that show us how our language functions, or what sort
of phenomenon it is."). Professor Stanley Fish has made the point as follows:
The person who looks about and sees, without reflection, a field already
organized by problems, impending decisions, possible courses of action,
goals, consequences, desiderata, etc. is not free to choose or originate his
own meanings, because a set of meanings has, in a sense, already chosen him
and is working itself out in the actions of perception, interpretation,
judgment, eta he is even now performing.
Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1325, 1333 (1984).
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the aid of a heart attack victim in the park. 8 So, Black's argument
that the "literal" term "no," standing alone, dictates an absolute
reading of the Establishment Clause profoundly misunderstands how
words convey meaning.
Language (and thus text) is a social practice. Our practices are
constituted by forces such as history, past practices, past decisions,
ideologies, and beliefs. These forces, in turn, are merely the other
methods of constitutional interpretation. Textualism, therefore, is not
an independent method of interpretation. To treat it as such masks
resort to the other methods. Consequently, textualism offers a false
sense that the Constitution's words, something outside of us, dictate
our interpretations. Yet, the text is us; it represents all our shared
practices and understandings. In the end, everything is textualism,
thus there is no such thing as textualism.n19
One last word before moving on. I am not arguing that text plays
no role in our constitutional government. Text points us to the
relevant practices and understandings that then yield meaning. For
example, in our case study, the Statehood Clause provided a point of
reference in examining history, structure, past government practice,
and judicial precedent. We knew to look for material that concerned
the Clause or its subject matter. It is possible, however, for a
constitutional regime to function without an official text. In that case,
constitutional decision-makers would resort directly to the shared
history, practices, and understandings that constitute their
government.2 40 That the United States has adopted a constitutional
text, and that the text is often pushed into rhetorical service, should
not obscure that interpretation proceeds from sources that lie behind
text.
In our case study, we saw how history, precedent, and past
government practice determined usage of the Statehood Clause. The
text of the Clause could not determine whether division was
prohibited because words alone are not meaning. Instead, meaning
came when we situated the text as words spoken by certain people
who practiced certain rules of grammar. Also, the words appear in a
Constitution that has its own applicable history and practices. That
238. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Judith N. Levi, On Regulatory Variables:
Regulatory Variables and Statutory Interpretation, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 1103, 1109-12
(1995).
239. Cf. Pierre Schlag, Hiding the Ball, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1681, 1691 (1996) ("The
Constitution is not so much a text or a structure or a charter, but rather a combination
of various modes of legal argument. What is to be interpreted and given effect is not
words or clauses or even structures, but rather the self-referential practices of
constitutional meaning.").
240. England is often cited as such a regime. See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological
Origins of the American Revolution 67-69 (1967) (describing the British conception
of a constitution, which did not entail a written document enforceable against the
government).
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history showed the framers discussing the Clause as if it allowed
division, and judicial precedent showed the Supreme Court doing the
same. Past government practice showed Congress acting like the
Clause allowed division. These various practices, not the text, helped
us understand the Clause's language.
One might object that the textual analysis in Part II.A.1 proves that
textualism exists. After all, that discussion actually offered competing
interpretations of the text of the Statehood Clause. But the
perception that text speaks to our question is an illusion. Underlying
the textual analysis were unspoken assumptions that lie outside text.
Without these assumptions, not only would constitutional analysis be
impossible, but the question itself would be unintelligible.
To see how unspoken assumptions really controlled the textualist
analysis,241 consider how text that seemed ambiguous to a present-day
interpreter seemed clear in historical context. This dissonance is
explained by changing expectations over time. At the time of the
founding, the United States was a nation on the verge of great
expansion. Of immediate relevance, the Constitution's framers knew
that the existing states were quickly laying claim to western lands,
expanding their territorial jurisdiction in conflict with claims of the
United States and other states.242 Indeed, before drafting the
Constitution, this same generation had passed the Northwest
Ordinance, which brought order and structure to American expansion
north of the Ohio River and east of the Mississippi River. 43 At both
the national and state level, territorial boundaries were often in flux
or in dispute.
From this perspective, power to divide an existing state seemed
obviously expedient. States might expand their territorial reach
beyond their ability to govern legitimately. At a time of relatively
undeveloped transportation and communication, a great distance
between citizens and the seat of state government could mean
effective disenfranchisement.244 Also, as settlement and development
of large states occurred apace, different regional interests might arise
that would be better served by different state governments.245
241. Of course, this listing will be incomplete for two reasons. First, for reasons of
practicality, space is short, and a partial list will serve the present purpose. Second,
given how deep many of these assumptions run, a single writer may not be able to
unearth all the assumptions that underlie her constitutional analysis. Indeed, that the
reader will identify other assumptions that the writer failed to acknowledge illustrates
how covertly these assumptions influence our thinking.
242. Charles Sellers, Henry May, & Neil R. McMillen, A Synopsis of American
History 58 (5th ed. 1981).
243. Id at 59.
244. Rosemarie Zagarri, The Politics of Size: Representation in the United States,
1776-1850, at 21 (1987) ("Eighteenth century Americans routinely assumed that
outlying regions would be less well represented than those nearer the capital.").
245. 2 Farrand, supra note 82, at 463-64 (discussing how delegate Luther Martin of
Maryland raised concerns about those citizens living in the western reaches of
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Division could solve both problems. Thus, it should be no surprise
that the framers agreed that division was a necessary power, and
argued only over how division should occur.246
Today, the concerns that animated state division are largely
forgotten. America's era of territorial expansion lies behind her, and
state boundaries have stabilized. 47 While each census reveals
population shifts and demographic changes, we no longer treat these
matters as cause to reconsider state boundaries. Perhaps Americans
are less tied to state identities. Or, perhaps state governments seem
less relevant since the New Deal expansion of federal power.
Regardless, we treat the composition of the fifty existing states as
given. Division does not enter our thoughts.
I believe that these differing perspectives, and not the words of the
Statehood Clause, explain the textual analysis in Part II.A.1. During
that analysis, no answer to our question-does the Constitution allow
division of an existing state-leapt out as obvious. So, we bounced
around among different possible interpretations, imbuing factors such
as punctuation and word order with exaggerated significance. This
ambivalence was possible only because we came to the issue with no
expectations, for the expectations we bring to the analysis help us
select among plausible constitutional interpretations. Each possible
interpretation of the Statehood Clause is associated with a set of
expectations within which that interpretation makes sense. If one
interpretation matches our expectations, that interpretation is
privileged, and all other evidence is judged against that preferred
interpretation. For example, if we lived in a world where territorial
expansion and shifting state boundaries were the norm, we would
expect our Constitution to allow division of an existing state. Instead,
our contemporary frame of reference creates no expectations about
division, and thus multiple interpretations of the Statehood Clause
seem plausible.
To further illustrate the role of expectations, consider Professor
David Strauss' recent article on the relevance of constitutional
amendments.248  Professor Strauss argues that constitutional
amendments make little difference in constitutional interpretation for
two reasons. First, if the amendment reflects an overwhelming
national consensus-what I refer to above as a generation's
"expectations" -then a constitutional amendment is not necessary.249
Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia).
246. See supra Part II.A.
247. Today, state boundary disputes largely concern the shifting course of natural
features, such as rivers, that serve as state boundary lines. See, e.g., Illinois v.
Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380, 382 (1991) (boundary dispute arose when dams raised level
of the Ohio River).
248. David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv. L.
Rev. 1457 (2001).
249. Id. at 1462.
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Constitutional interpretation will reflect the national consensus
regardless of whether it is enshrined in a written amendment.5'
Second, if an amendment does not reflect a national consensus,
decision-makers will evade the requirements of the written
amendment5 1 Either way, constitutional text plays no interpretive
role.
Similarly, consider whether the constitutional result concerning the
power to divide an existing state would be any different if the
Statehood Clause had been written differently. Imagine that a
separate sentence of the Clause provided, "No new State shall be
formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State." If this
wording contradicted strongly held expectations, one would expect
Congress to evade the purported limitation. For example, in
admitting a new state that lay within an existing state, Congress could
argue that the new state lay outside the legitimate "Jurisdiction" of
the existing state.5" Expectations would control implementation of
text.253
In sum, textual analysis proceeds even though text does not do the
interpretive work. An issue arises, such as whether the Constitution
allows division of an existing state, and we identify text that
supposedly bears on that issue. If we bring strong expectations to that
issue, one answer grabs hold and is then tested against the other
methods of interpretation. If we have no expectations, a variety of
interpretations present themselves, with each such interpretation
assuming a set of expectations. Ultimately, the methods of history,
structure, precedent, and past government actions will help us choose
the relevant set of expectations and associated interpretation. Text
does not and cannot do so.
Lesson 2: The Proper Role of Grammar
Grammar is important to communicating by written word. Used
properly, grammar helps us say what we mean. But, we all have had
those moments when a grammarphone corrects our technical mistake,
and we respond in an irritated tone, "You know what I mean." And
they did know what you meant. That is because grammar is just one
means to understanding; it is not understanding itself. The full
250. Id
251. Id. at 1463.
252. This was done in the case of Vermont, where Congress admitted the state
even though New York argued that Vermont lay within its jurisdiction. Because New
York ultimately consented to Vermont statehood, the issue of New York's
jurisdiction never arose. See supra note 86.
253. Admission of West Virginia is a case where Congress evaded the requirement
that a state consent to its division. As noted above, during the Civil War, Congress
recognized a pro-North faction within Virginia as the legitimate state government.
See supra note 171. Congress accepted the consent of this rogue government as
sufficient for the division of Virginia and the admission of West Virginia.
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context of usage conveys meaning. So, while grammar is helpful,
when confronted with a grammatically correct interpretation, we
should not ignore that voice whispering from within the text: "You
know what I mean. ' '1 54
We should be even warier of grammar-based arguments when the
text is from an earlier time, as grammar rules may change over time.
The Statehood Clause demonstrates that the semi-colon and the
comma did not always serve distinct grammatical functions. This
knowledge dissolved what was otherwise a difficult interpretive
problem for our modern-day grammarian. Again, text must be placed
in its proper context.
When grammar conventions change, we ought to honor the
grammar practices at the time of the drafting. As discussed above, we
have two good reasons for doing so. First, changed constitutional
readings based on changes in grammar do not have democratic
legitimacy.251 The Constitution gains its legitimacy, in part, from the
heightened form of popular consent it purportedly represents. While
society might reach a consensus about new grammar practices, it is
unlikely the effect of those changes on the Constitution's meaning was
considered. Thus, popular consent to changes in grammar does not
imply popular consent to corresponding changes in constitutional
meaning.
Second, because changes in grammar are substantively neutral, any
corresponding change in constitutional meaning will be random,
having no relationship to the reasons why the grammar rules
changed. 6 For example, the change in how we use semi-colons does
not suggest anything about whether, and if so, how Congress may
divide a state. This is unlike changes in word usage, which often imply
a substantive idea that supports a changed reading of the Constitution.
Lesson 3: The Limited Utility of Past Government Practice
A past government practice may serve as precedent only for
precisely the same conduct, and is of limited use in supporting
somewhat different conduct. When a past practice is invoked to
support a somewhat different practice, the question becomes whether
the difference is relevant, thus destroying the analogy. To be useful,
we need to know something about why the past practice was engaged
in. The problem is that past practices often come without
explanations.
254. See Smith, supra note 47, at 16-17 (everyone knows that the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment and Seventeenth Amendment mean something other than what a
grammatical reading of their texts suggest).
255. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
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Consider the past government practices discussed in this case study.
First, in determining whether the Statehood Clause allowed Congress
to divide a state, we reviewed the admission of Kentucky and
Vermont to the Union. Congress created these states by dividing
Virginia and New York respectively?- Here we have the most
helpful case of past government practice: the issue is whether
Congress has power to take a specific action, and history shows that
Congress has taken that specific action. The past government practice
can serve as precedent without any need for analogies or inquiry into
the government's reasons for acting.
The second government practice at issue was whether Congress
could simultaneously admit a state and consent to its future division.
Since Congress has never done so, there is no past government
practice directly on point. Rather, we looked to a similar situation
where Congress authorized Minnesota to hold pre-statehood elections
for her post-statehood federal representatives3 s The question was
whether pre-statehood congressional authorization of elections should
serve as precedent for pre-statehood congressional authorization of
division of a state. The answer depends on why Congress thought it
could authorize elections. If Congress believed it could authorize any
action related to statehood, then division of a state fits that rationale.
If, however, Congress believed it could authorize only matters
necessary to statehood, then division of a state does not fit. Without
knowing why Congress acted as it did, we cannot know how the past
government practice applies to our issue.
The third issue-whether congressional and state consent to
division must occur within a time limit-received even less help from
past government practice. Since there are no relevant practices under
the Statehood Clause, we examined practices under other
constitutional provisions. The amendment process looked promising
because Congress had addressed a similar issue of time limits: Does
the Constitution limit the time between congressional proposal and
state ratification?1 9 This government practice, however, posed two
interpretive problems. First, it is not clear whether precedent from
the amendment process is relevant to the statehood process. Do both
processes serve the same functions or purposes? Without answering
these questions, we cannot know whether practices from one context
can shed light on practices from the other. Second, it was not clear
why Congress decided to accept the Twenty-Seventh Amendment
despite the lengthy ratification process. Without knowing why
Congress did so, we do not know whether that decision applies to the
five-state provision. Because Congress acted without explaining itself,
257. See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 127-134 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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we have little if any basis for analogizing or distinguishing these
government practices.
This problem with past government practices can be seen in the
contemporary commentary on Professor Bruce Ackerman's theory of
constitutional moments. Professor Ackerman argues that "We the
People" may amend the Constitution outside of the Article V
Amendment process. Specifically, we may do so when all branches of
the federal government and the People concur with, or acquiesce in, a
changed reading of the Constitution after a period of heightened
debate.2 6° The main problem with this theory is determining when this
has happened. Consider the four instances when Professor Ackerman
argues such heightened debate and consensus has occurred: the
founding era's establishment of the Constitution; the Reconstruction
era's shift from state to federal power; the New Deal era's
consolidation of national power over the economy; and the post-
World War II move from treaties to congressional-executive
agreements. In each case, commentators have taken Professor
Ackerman to task for reading too much into historical events. Where
he sees heightened debate and popular consensus, others see chaos
and political compromise.261 Who is correct? We just do not know,
primarily because historical practices often do not come with handy
explanations that fit within theories or methods of constitutional
interpretation. Sometimes, to paraphrase a popular saying, stuff
happens. To imbue it with more significance than that is simply futile.
260. Professor Ackerman summarizes the project as follows:
Decisions by the People occur rarely, and under special constitutional
conditions. Before gaining the authority to make supreme law in the name
of the People, a movement's political partisans must, first, convince an
extraordinary number of their fellow citizens to take their proposed
initiative with a seriousness that they do not normally accord to politics;
second, they must allow their opponents a fair opportunity to organize their
own forces; third, they must convince a majority of their fellow Americans to
support their initiative as its merits are discussed, time and again, in the
deliberative fora provided for "higher lawmaking." It is only then that a
political movement earns the enhanced legitimacy the dualist Constitution
accords to decisions made by the People.
Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 70, at 6. Professor Ackerman breaks this extra-
Article V process, which he calls "higher lawmaking," into four phases: "signaling"
"proposal," "mobilized popular deliberation," and "legal codification." See id. at 266-
67. He explains how these functions have been performed during past constitutional
movements, such as during the New Deal era. In doing so, he addresses questions
such as when a movement has coalesced enough support to propose its higher
lawmaking agenda to the People, and when the People have given such a proposal
sufficient focus and serious consideration, and assent, to constitute successful higher
lawmaking. See id. at 272-90. For our current purposes, however, we do not need a
detailed picture of Professor Ackerman's theory. Rather, the important point is that
his work seeks to identify conditions under which the Constitution sanctions extra-
Article V higher lawmaking.
261. See Tribe, supra note 207, at 1284-85 (arguing that the initial move from treaty
to congressional-executive agreement was done out of political compromise, with all
actors recognizing the dubious constitutionality of the practice).
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As lawyers in a common law system, we should not be surprised
that past government practice will often be of limited utility. A
system of precedent works only if decision-makers explain their
decisions. Their explanations then serve as the basis for deciding
whether the next case is similar to or different from the prior case.
Without an explanation, we have no basis for comparison.
Consequently, past government practice will be helpful in two cases:
first, where the past practice is identical to the practice under
consideration; second, where the government explained its reasons
behind the past practice, giving current decision-makers a basis on
which to analogize to or distinguish from the past practice.
Lesson 4: The Myth of Judicial Supremacy:
A final lesson flows from the following practical question: Who
could decide the constitutionality of the five-state provision? It is all
well and good to discuss issues in an academic setting, but who would
have the power to act on these arguments if the circumstances arose?
Our natural inclination, which is unfortunately shared by many
politicians, is that questions of constitutional law are for the courts.
This belief often lies behind the claim that judicial review leads to
judicial supremacy. Critics of judicial review use the term "judicial
supremacy" to mean that federal judges force their interpretation of
the Constitution on the other branches of national government.
Some critics of judicial review ignore the fact that many issues of
constitutional law are decided, both initially and finally, without
involving federal judges.263 Consequently, the notion that judicial
review necessarily entails judicial supremacy is false. The five-state
provision illustrates how judicial review of a complicated federalism
issue may be either highly contingent or non-existent.
At the moment, with Texas taking no action to divide itself, the
issue is not ripe for any decision-maker. But, assuming the five-state
provision catches the eye of some ambitious state legislator, who
would decide the constitutional issue? As with many legal questions,
the answer is, "It depends."
262. See Paul E. McGreal, Ambition's Playground, 68 Fordham L Rev. 1107, 1114-
19 (2000) (discussing various circumstances under which other actors decide
constitutional questions without participation of the federal judiciary).
263. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 9, at 1016 ("[B]ecause most contemporary
casebooks and courses are so unrelentingly U.S. Supreme Court-centered, they offer
a highly distorted understanding of the American constitutional system to the hapless
students exposed to them."); see also Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1359-62 (1997)
(advocating judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation); Neal Devins & Louis
Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 Va. L Rev. 83 (1998)
(reviewing claims of judicial exclusivity in constitutional interpretation).
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First, the Texas state legislature would decide whether it believed
division of Texas was constitutional. The legislators would have to
debate the three issues raised above to determine if the five-state
provision ever was, and still is, constitutionally valid. Presumably, if
they decided the provision was not valid, they would proceed no
further. In that case, the issue would remain dormant, finally decided
by the state legislature.
But assume the Texas legislature believes division is still
constitutional and passes a bill authorizing a special committee to
draft a plan of division for four new states. Under Texas law, all bills
passed by the state legislature go on to the governor for approval or
veto. If the governor approved, the state would move on toward
division. But assume the governor did not approve and attempted to
veto the bill consenting to division. Both the Constitution and the
five-state provision speak in terms of consent by the state's
"legislature," omitting reference to the state's executive. Do the
Constitution and the five-state provision give final say to the state
legislature, or may the governor play a role?
At this point, federal courts may play a role in deciding the role of
the governor. The Supreme Court has never decided this issue, and
its precedents in other contexts are divided. For example, the Court
has held that the reference to the state legislature in Article V on
ratification of amendments means only the state legislature, leaving
no role for state referenda.264 Conversely, the Court has held that the
reference to the state legislature in Article I, section 4, granting state
legislatures the power to regulate the times, places, and manner for
federal elections, includes the state executive if that officer has veto
power over ordinary state legislation.265 Regardless of how this initial
issue is decided, the Court would still not be deciding the core issue-
whether the five-state provision is constitutional.
If the Texas governor is ultimately conceded a role in consenting to
division, her decision will determine how the process continues. If the
governor decides division is unconstitutional (or politically
inadvisable), she will veto the bill consenting to division, and the
legislature will need a two-thirds vote of each chamber to override the
veto. If the state legislature cannot override the veto, division is dead
(for now), and no court has touched the issue.
But assume that the governor approves the consent, the legislature
overrides the governor's veto, or the governor is held to have no role
in the process. In any of these cases, Texas moves on toward division.
At this point, does anyone have standing to sue Texas in federal court
264. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221,229 (1920).
265. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 367 (1932) ("As the authority is conferred for
the purpose of making laws for the State, it follows.., that the exercise of the
authority must be in accordance with the method which the State has prescribed for
legislative enactments.").
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to challenge the constitutionality of division? The Supreme Court has
held that a litigant has standing only if she has suffered a concrete
personal injury traceable to the challenged conduct, and a court
decision would redress that injury. 66 Consider several potential
litigants under this standard.
First, consider a Texas citizen. It is not clear what injury the person
would allege. Some current Texas citizens would become citizens of
one of the new states. Presumably, each of the new states would have
governments constituted in accordance with the Constitution. For
example, the new state governments would have to be "republican" in
character, 67 could not exclude citizens based on race,2' s and so on. So,
as long as the new states' governments are consistent with the
Constitution, what injury is caused by changing the political
boundaries of a state? An individual citizen does not suffer any
concrete harm. She is still guaranteed all rights under the
Constitution. She still has a vote in both state and national
government. She may still relocate to another state at will. Standing
will likely fail for this reason. 9
Next, consider a fellow state.270 The state could allege an injury of
diluted political power in the Senate. With one Texas, each state
delegation is one-fiftieth of the Senate; with five Texases, each state is
reduced to one-fifty-fourth-not a major dilution, but a dilution
nonetheless. But, the Supreme Court recently held that government
officials do not have standing to challenge government actions that
dilute the effectiveness of their power in the abstract, unconnected
with a specific vote.2" This rationale could be applied to the states to
deny them standing.' z
Last, consider an official of the United States government, such as
the President or a member of Congress. The President could argue an
injury regarding a changed electoral college count in the next election,
assuming the president was eligible for re-election. A Senator could
argue vote dilution, just as the states did above. But, once again, these
266. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560-61 (1992).
267. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
268. Id- amend. XIV.
269. Even if the citizen could identify some injury, that injury will not be personal
to her. The Supreme Court has rejected standing when the litigant's only injury is a
"generalized grievance" shared by most other citizens. See Tribe, supra note 152, § 3-
17, at 415-24.
270. Id. § 3-20, at 453 ("Whether a state suing on its own behalf has standing to do
so in the case at hand depends on whether the ordinary rules of standing are satisfied;
no special standing rules are applied.").
271. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829-30 (1997) (holding Members of Congress do
not have standing to challenge Line Item Veto Act, which allegedly altered the
effectiveness of a member's vote by giving president power to cancel part of a bill).




claims of power dilution may not present the type of concrete,
personal injury required for standing.273
If no litigant has standing, Texas may forge ahead and establish four
new state governments. Each of these new states would be entitled to
two senators and an unspecified number of representatives.274 Upon
election, these senators and representatives would appear at Congress
seeking their seats. At this point, the House and the Senate would
decide whether to seat these members, and, in doing so, effectively
decide whether the new state governments were constitutionally
created.275 If both chambers seat the new members, the issue of
constitutionality would again be resolved without court intervention.
If either the Senate or the House refuses to seat the new Texas
members, those members could sue Congress for their seats.
Representative Adam Clayton Powell did so when the House refused
to seat him based on allegations of criminal wrongdoing.2 76 These
members would likely have standing, but then the question would be
whether their challenge raised a non-justiciable political question.
Strong arguments exist for finding a political question: judges have no
standard for setting a time limit on consent,277 and the Statehood
Clause appears to commit statehood issues to Congress.278 Further,
the issue would require the Court to decide which governments were
lawfully established within Texas, an issue the Court has previously
declined to decide. 79 If the suit presented a political question, the
courts would dismiss without reaching the merits.
In sum, the constitutionality of the five-state provision seems likely
to evade judicial review. The most likely reason is that no one will
ever try to use the provision to divide Texas. But, even if a future
Texas legislature had an itch to do so, the doctrines of standing and
political question may conspire to keep the issue out of the courts.
273. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 829-30.
274. The Constitution does not address re-apportionment of representatives when
a state is divided between decennial censuses. Presumably, each of the new states
would receive their share of representatives after the next intervening census, but
until that time Congress would have to make provision for interim representation. It
is not clear whether the new Texas states could make some provision among
themselves without congressional action.
275. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government....").
276. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,489-90 (1969).
277. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1993) (indicating that
propriety of Senate process used to try impeachment is a political question in part
because Constitution does not provide a judicially applicable standard for resolving
the issue).
278. See id. at 229 (stating that propriety of Senate impeachment process is a
political question in part because Constitution commits trial of impeachments to the
Senate's "sole" discretion).
279. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 39 (1849) (declining to decide which
government properly governed Rhode Island in the wake of the Dorr Rebellion).
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Thus, we might add the five-state provision to the list of counter-
examples that disprove the myth of judicial supremacy.
B. Lessons About Constitutional Law: A Typology of
Constitutional Questions
In addition to the discrete lessons just discussed, our case study
reveals something about constitutional interpretation more generally.
Each of the three questions suggests a different type of constitutional
issue and the interpretive challenges associated with it. One caveat,
though, before I proceed. I am not prescribing how constitutional
analysis ought to proceed; this section is not normative. Rather, I
offer a descriptive account of analysis under the methods, constructed
from the attempt at doing constitutional law in Part II.
The picture of constitutional interpretation painted by our case
study stands in stark contrast to the picture painted by some
commentators. These writers take a text-based view, categorizing
constitutional interpretation based on the type of clause involved.
Once again, Professor John Hart Ely offers a good example.' On the
one hand, Professor Ely identifies what he calls "relatively specific"
clauses where "the language is so clear that a conscious reference to
purpose seems unnecessary. '"" On the other hand, he identifies
"extremely open-textured" clauses that require resort outside the
Constitution for interpretation.' In between lie different gradations
of clauses, some more ambiguous than others, that may be
interpreted, with more or less difficulty, by consulting historical
materials. Professor Ely, then, takes a clause-based approach to
identifying interpretive problems.
We can see the difficulty with Professor Ely's approach when we
consider examples from each category. First, he cites the thirty-five
year presidential age limit as an example of a relatively specific
constitutional provision-one that can be interpreted with text
alone.' But, as discussed above, the text of even that Clause does
little interpretive work.2 The easy questions, such as whether the
Clause refers to chronological age or a period in a person's life, are
answered by practices and understandings that lie behind the text, not
the text itself. Further, when no practice or understanding exists, the
Clause is difficult to apply. Thus, it seems that the ambiguity of a
280. See Ely, supra note 220. Professor Ronald Dworkin takes a similar approach.
See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution 7-9 (1996).
281. Ely, supra note 220, at 13.
282. Id
283. Id. Professor Dworkin cites the same Clause for the same proposition. See
Dworkin, supra note 280, at 8.
284. See supra notes 204-217 and accompanying text.
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Clause depends on the question asked and does not inhere in the text
itself.
Second, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments provide examples of relatively open-textured
provisions. While Professor Ely argues that the clauses plainly
concern process and not substance, 5 they do not further prescribe
what "process" is "due." But, all lawyers would agree that these
clauses at least require notice and an opportunity to be heard in
virtually all judicial proceedings.86 This unanimity does not flow from
the text; the clauses do not mention either notice or a hearing. Yet,
few, if any, lawyers would say that the requirement came from outside
the Constitution; they would insist that the clauses on their own
require notice and a hearing. How do we reconcile these seemingly
inconsistent beliefs? Again, through a proper understanding of how
text works. Text has practices and understandings associated with it,
and the text is used as a stand-in for these practices and
understandings. The widespread practice and understanding of the
legal community is that litigants are due both notice and a hearing in
most judicial proceedings. The question is easy because of widely
shared practices and understandings, not because text is plain or
clear.287
The clause-based categorization does not accurately describe how
constitutional law works. Our case study points to a different
approach: an issue-based categorization. In Part II, the same text-
the Statehood Clause-produced both easy and hard questions of
interpretation. The difficulty of the question had nothing to do with
whether the text was "open-textured" or "relatively specific." Rather,
285. See supra notes 218-230 and accompanying text.
286. See Tribe, supra note 158, § 10-7, at 664; see also Ely, supra note 220, at 19
(noting that "the general outlines of the law of procedural due process were pretty
clear and uncontroversial").
287. Professor Pierre Schlag makes a similar point regarding so-called "totality of
the circumstances" tests:
Consider, for instance, the "balancing" or "totality of circumstances" tests
that are often used in constitutional law. These tests viewed in isolation look
very flexible. But as soon as we consider how they are applied by judges, it
becomes apparent that these tests merely defer the constraints on judicial
decision making to some external source such as precedent. In other words,
the very flexibility of balancing and totality of circumstances tests refers
litigants and judges to other stable norms to inform decision making. This
precedent boundedness is inflexible. But we tend not to see this inflexibility
as an aspect of the standard. Rather, we see the inflexibility as external: If
judges and litigants pay too much attention to the facts of precedent, that is
their own choice, not something attributable to the standard form of
balancing or totality of circumstances tests-or so the argument goes. I
think this is wrong: Inflexibility is just as much a part of standards as their
supposed flexibility.
Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379, 413 (1985) (citation
omitted).
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the difficulty had to do with whether the various sources of meaning
that lie behind the text and give it meaning addressed our question.
The three issues from our case study illustrate different levels of
interpretative difficulty that in turn suggest a rough typology of
constitutional issues.
First, a metaphor for discussion purposes. Now, I know that
constitutional law needs another metaphor for interpretation as
urgently as law professors need self-esteem training.2 Constitutional
interpretation has been analogized to translating a foreign language, 9
religion,29 playing music,291 interpreting literature,- and writing a
chain novel.293 I offer yet another analogy here, but neither as a
rigorous description intended to capture all aspects of constitutional
interpretation, nor as a normative prescription for constitutional
interpretation. Rather, the analogy illustrates that our interpretive
practice-as revealed by the case study-involves issues of varying
difficulty, not clauses of varying ambiguity. In short, our practice is
issue-centered, not clause-centered.
A person doing constitutional interpretation is in a similar position
to a person who has a piece to a jigsaw puzzle and knows that it
belongs to one of two puzzles. Both puzzles are only missing one
piece, and the question is in which puzzle does the piece fit best? In
this metaphor, the two puzzles represent two possible interpretations
of the Constitution,2' and the piece is the available interpretive
information-text, structure, history, and so on. Which puzzle
(interpretation) does that piece (interpretive information) best
complete? 29
As with an issue of constitutional interpretation, the puzzle problem
may be easy or hard. The easiest case would be where only one
puzzle is missing a piece the same shape and size as the available
piece. The puzzle builder's choice is obvious. This case is analogous
to the issue whether the thirty-five-year presidential age limit refers to
chronological age or a period in a person's life. Recall that that issue
seemed obvious because of our uniform practice that age limits refer
288. See Sanford Levinson, Translation: Who Needs I?, 65 Fordham L Rev. 1457,
1457-61 (1997) (discussing the use of analogies in describing constitutional
interpretation).
289. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L Rev. 1165, 1175-82
(1993).
290. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 9-53 (1988).
291. See Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts,
139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1597, 1604-14 (1991).
292. See Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tex. L Rev. 373, 373-77 (1982).
293. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 228-29 (1986).
294. Of course, the metaphor could be changed to three or more pumdes if there
are three or more competing interpretations of the Constitution.
295. Theorists as varying as Ronald Dworkin and Stanley Fish concede that
different decision-makers will, in good faith, read the same interpretive data in
different ways. See Dworkin, supra note 280, at 11-12; Fish, supra note 237.
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to chronological age. Indeed, any other interpretation seemed absurd.
Thus, the easiest case is when only one interpretation is plausible on
its face. Call this a Type I question.
Before moving on, a quick word on "obviousness." Again, the
criteria for judging "obviousness" and "absurdity" are the currently-
accepted methods of constitutional interpretation, as well as the then-
accepted uses of those methods, which we used throughout the case
study.296 To someone who either follows different methods (as in
another legal system), does not accept the methods, or makes
different rhetorical uses of the methods, the answer will not seem
obvious.297 Further, to say that an answer appears "obvious" given
certain practices is not to say that the answer is objectively or
normatively correct. The methods and their accepted uses merely
constitute existing practices, they do not provide a normative
justification. Indeed, if our practices change, answers that once
appeared obvious under prior practices will no longer appear so. As
Professor Stanley Fish puts it, "[Y]ou always know, but.., what you
know, because it rests on a structure of assumptions and beliefs
(which produce [different] meanings), is subject to challenge or
revision, as a result of which you will still always know, even though
what you know will be different. 298
Now, let's make things a little more, but not too, difficult for our
puzzle builder. Assume that the available piece is the same size and
shape as the holes in our two puzzles. Also, assume that the missing
piece depicts a car, and one puzzle depicts downtown traffic at rush
hour, while the other puzzle shows stars in the night sky. Our puzzle
builder should have little trouble placing the piece in the proper
puzzle. The missing piece fits the context of only one puzzle. Call this
a Type II question.
The first issue-whether the Statehood Clause allowed division of
an existing state-is a Type II question. Because neither answer
seemed absurd on its face, we do not have the easiest case where the
piece physically fits only one puzzle. However, the question was still
easy. While text was obscure, history, structure, past government
practice, and precedent fit quite clearly into only one interpretation-
the Statehood Clause allows division of states. Thus, the next easiest
case is where all the methods point to one of two plausible
interpretations.
Now things start getting hard for our puzzle builder. Assume once
again that the available piece depicts a car, and one puzzle shows
downtown traffic at rush hour. Assume this time, however, that the
second puzzle depicts a child playing with toy cars. This case presents
296. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
298. See Fish, supra note 211, at 196.
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our puzzle builder with more difficult judgments. Because the piece is
not obviously out of place in either picture, our puzzle builder must
start asking questions. Does the missing piece look more like a real
car or a toy car? Does the car fit better within the overall background
of one puzzle or the other? At this point, we are still trying to draw
clues from the puzzle and the piece itself, trying to harmonize both.
Call this a Type III question.
Our second issue-can Congress simultaneously admit and
consent-presented a Type III question. Unlike the first issue, none
of the methods answered our specific question. Some methods, like
text and past government practice, fit with both interpretations.
Other methods, such as structure and judicial precedent, supplied
principles, arguments, and examples for analysis. Our task was to
determine whether these principles, arguments, and examples best fit
with arguments for or against our issue, or provided equal (or no)
support to either side. In the end, the methods were most consistent
with allowing Congress to simultaneously admit and consent.
Finally, we come to the hardest case for our puzzle builder.
Assume once again that the missing piece depicts a car, and both
puzzles show downtown traffic in the same city, one during rush hour
and one at mid-day. Identifying the proper puzzle for a piece now
requires an aesthetic judgment. Which color scheme works better?
Which puzzle has better flow with the piece? These questions ask us
to bring criteria outside the puzzle to bear. Call this a Type IV
question.
In constitutional interpretation, a Type IV question exists when
none of the methods fit better with one interpretation than the other.
At that point, the decision-maker must resort to principles, ideologies,
or preferences outside the interpretive methods.-' For example,
Justice Antonin Scalia adopts a background principle of democratic
accountability in cases of interpretive doubt. When interpretive
methods provide no answer, he upholds the decision of accountable
government actors.30 Conversely, one could opt for a background
299. Again, the constitutional methods are themselves merely descriptive and, thus,
are not neutral, objective criteria for judging the rightness of a constitutional
interpretation. Cf. Stephen M. Feldman, Playing with the Pieces: Postnodernism in
the Lawyer's Toolbox, 85 Va. L. Rev. 151, 178 (1999) (noting that "from a
postmodem standpoint, having unexamined background assumptions is
unavoidable").
300. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("A State's choice between
two positions on which reasonable people can disagree is constitutional even when (as
is often the case) it intrudes upon a "liberty" in the absolute sense."); Rutan v.
Republican Party of II1., 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (stating that "when a practice not
expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement of a long
tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning
of the Republic, we have no proper basis for striking it down") (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Of course, this principle is useless for a member of Congress in making the initial
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principle of individual liberty: when interpretive methods provide no
answer, decide the way that increases individual liberty from
government action. Either way, an extra-constitutional background
principle, not constitutional method, supplies the answer.
Now, one might object that the background principle, ideology, or
preference described above is itself constitutional in origin. For
example, Justice Scalia argues that his democracy-promoting principle
is itself a constitutional principle. This objection is misplaced for two
reasons. First, it mistakenly assumes that the Constitution prefers one
interpretive method, approach, or principle over all others. As I have
argued elsewhere, this is incorrect. 0 1 Second, if a principle like
democracy has any bearing on a constitutional issue, it has been
already considered, to the extent relevant, in analysis under the other
interpretive methods. Democratic values may have been a concern in
drafting a specific clause, or democratic government may be a
constitutional structure. If so, democratic principles will show up in
those methods of interpretation. If not, then the decision-maker is
importing extra-constitutional, personally-held principles, values, or
ideology into the analysis.
It is on a Type IV question that our decision-maker is most
susceptible to her political preferences. When the methods are in
equipoise, political preference may tip the scale one way or the other,
causing the decision-maker to mistakenly perceive the case for one
interpretation as stronger than the other. When the judge nonetheless
justifies her decision based on the methods, she will be criticized as
using constitutional method to rationalize a decision based on other
grounds.302
In practice, it may be impossible to distinguish Type III and Type
IV constitutional questions. In most cases, personal preferences and
beliefs will affect our perception without our conscious knowledge, as
if we are wearing a pair of glasses we forget we have on. We cannot
reliably tell whether the slight weight of the methods or personal
preferences produced a given constitutional interpretation. Perhaps
our only guide will be that Type IV cases cause more vehement and
venomous rhetoric from the opposing sides. For, when personal
principle, not constitutional method, supplies the deciding factor, a
judge may react viscerally to criticism or opposition because she may
feel under attack personally and not simply professionally. We are
vested in our personal principles in a way that we are not in the
methods of interpretation. We feel the sting of rebuttal more deeply
when it hits personal principles than when it hits our use of method.
Thus, while we intellectually may not be able to distinguish between
decision whether to pass a constitutionally doubtful law.
301. See McGreal, supra note 262, at 1172-96.
302. See Louis Michael Seidman & Mark V. Tushnet, Remnants of Belief:
Contemporary Constitutional Issues 197 (1996).
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interpretations produced by method versus personal views, our gut
may be able to do so for us.
Our case study helps us to see that Type IV cases exist. It is likely
that few, if any, people have strongly held personal or political views
that bear on the constitutionality of the five-state provision. Further,
the likelihood of Texas dividing itself any time soon is almost zero.
The five-state provision may be the rare constitutional issue that
allows use of the interpretive methods free from the usual outside
influences. The case study, then, offers an ideal opportunity to
identify a Type IV question. And, the third question-is there a time
limit on congressional and state consent to division-posed a Type IV
question, unresolvable under the constitutional methods. Each
method either has nothing to say or supports both interpretations
equally. If that question is to be answered, we must resort to some
extra-constitutional principle or policy.
CONCLUSION: THE DILEMMA OF TYPE IV CASES
While the admission that Type IV cases exist may seem like a
defeat for the rule of law and principled constitutional decision-
making, it is really just a recognition that law is a human endeavor.
No single system of human thought can solve all problems and answer
all questions. Thus, it should be no surprise that the methods of legal
analysis, born of human practice and not divine inspiration, have their
limits. Beyond those limits, the make up of the individual takes over.
Is it surprising that Justice Hugo Black, a Senator from Alabama and
one time member of the Klu Klux Klan, having seen first hand
southern resistance to racial equality, took a strong stand against
southern resistance to Brown v. Board of Education?"3 Similarly, is it
surprising that Justice Harry Blackmun, former general counsel to the
Mayo Clinic2s3 4 expressed great deference to the judgment of medical
professionals in his abortion decisions?3s Or, that Justice Scalia, a
professed Roman Catholic, 6 reserves his most venomous rhetoric for
decisions upholding abortion rights and homosexual rights?' That is
303. Cf Black, supra note 233, at 933-41.
304. Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court
86-87 (1979).
305. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) ("For the stage prior to
approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation
must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.").
306. Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen & Steffen N. Johnson, Scalia's Sermonette, 72
Notre Dame L. Rev. 863, 864 (1997) (quoting a speech by Justice Scalia where he
addresses modem-day criticism of Christian believers: "To be honest about it, that is
the view of Christians taken by modern society. We are fools for Christ's sake. We
must pray for the courage to endure the scom of the modern world.").
307. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 639 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If
merely stating this alleged 'equal protection' violation does not suffice to refute it, our
constitutional jurisprudence has achieved terminal silliness."); Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
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not to say that people's actions are perfectly determined by their past
experiences, or that anyone would have foreseen these Justices'
specific decisions."' Rather, the point is that we do not check
ourselves at the door when we make legal decisions.3 9
So, what should we do about Type IV cases? Consider three
approaches. First, we could screen life-tenured judges for personal
preferences and the like, but there probably is no reliable way to do
so. Two people who have the same experience may take different
lessons from it, and people from the same region, profession, religion,
and so forth, are not homogenous. 310 Perhaps the only relevant data
may be the person's past actions. How has the person acted when she
made decisions or expressed her views? Even then, it may be no more
than reading tea leaves.
Second, some commentators admit that outside principles must
come into the analysis, but privilege one source or another for these
principles.3 ' One commentator has called this approach the search
for a "meta-algorithm" that can resolve constitutional questions when
the methods are unclear or in conflict.3 2 For example, Professors
Ronald Dworkin, John Hart Ely, and Douglas Laycock have argued
that these principles can be found in the Constitution itself.313 Each
attempt to derive background principles from various aspects of the
Constitution. And, commentators have criticized these authors for
deriving their principles from personal political commitments, not the
Constitution.
the judgment) (stating that Justice O'Connor's reasoning for the plurality "cannot be
taken seriously").
308. Indeed, Justice William Brennan, also a Roman Catholic, disagreed with
Justice Scalia on many constitutional issues, including abortion.
309. Cf. Joseph L. Badaracco, Jr., The Discipline of Building Character, Harv. Bus.
Rev. Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 115, 119 (describing difficulty for managers in gaining
consensus within an organization because "[dlifferences in upbringing, religion,
ethnicity, and education make it difficult for any two people to view a situation
similarly-let alone an entire group of people.").
310. See Bruce W. Burton, The "O.K. Corral Principle:" Finding the Proper Role
for Judicial Notice in Police Misconduct Matters, 29 N.M. L. Rev. 301, 316-18 (1999);
Mark H. Hailer, Urban Crime and Criminal Justice: The Chicago Case, 57 J. Am. Hist.
619 (1970).
311. A similar approach is to privilege one of the methods over the others. For
example, some argue that history or text ought to take precedence over other
methods of interpretation. This approach has two problems. First, it offers no
guidance when the preferred method is silent on the issue at hand. Second, these
commentators have no persuasive reason to privilege any single method over the
others. See Bobbitt, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 31-35, 155-56; Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204, 237-38
(1980); Fallon, supra note 11, at 1209 (criticizing theorists who privilege one
interpretive method over the others).
312. Bobbitt, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 122-25, 155.
313. See Dworkin, supra note 280, at 1-15; Ely, supra note 220, at 73-104; Douglas
Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review, 59 Tex. L. Rev.
343, 360-61 (1981); see generally Dworkin, supra note 293.
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The problem for these authors is that if their principles were
constitutional in origin, the methods would have already revealed
them. Once the methods have run out, so has the Constitution's
ability to answer the question. We truly are at a point where the
practice of constitutional interpretation offers no answer. Any
attempt to ground their principles in the Constitution, outside the
methods themselves, is futile, and serves only to deny the real basis of
the authors' analysis.
Other commentators, like Professor Michael Perry, overtly privilege
a non-constitutional source of principles. Professor Perry resorts to
moral principles in deciding hard cases."a4 When the standard
methods provide no answer, the decision-maker should identify moral
principles that can break the impasse. While Professor Perry offers
general guidance in identifying moral principles, he cannot claim a
consensus for his approach. Indeed, critics charge that his "moral
principles" amount to no more than personal preferences.
Judge Richard Posner also looks outside the Constitution, urging
consideration of policy and practical consequences when
constitutional method runs out."5 Law is instrumental, a tool to
achieve concrete goals and results. When a law is not clear, judges
ought to implement the interpretation that best achieves the goals or
results valued in that context. Posner, then, encourages an empirical
approach to law. If the concrete goal of equal protection is to obtain
real opportunities for minorities and women, judges ought to ask
whether their decision will actually create opportunities. For example,
will a decision prohibiting an all-male, public military college from
excluding women really provide women an opportunity for a military-
style education? For Posner, empirical questions like this decide
constitutional cases, not abstract legal arguments.
The multiplicity of views on the proper source of extra-
constitutional principles proves what we already know deep down, but
are perhaps afraid to admit-no objectively defensible source exists.
Commentators can offer proposals and try to persuade us that we
ought to follow suit. For example, Judge Posner uses his pragmatic
approach to analyze Supreme Court decisions and explain how his
approach helps decision-makers better implement policy in the real
world. His repeated critiques may persuade us that a pragmatic
approach best solves hard cases. In the end, however, only the actions
314. See generally Michael J. Perry, Morality, Politics, and Law: A Bicentennial
Essay (1988). Professor Ronald Dworkin can be read to take a similar approach in an
early work. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977). In his
recent work, however, Professor Dworkin stresses that moral principles must fit the
Constitution's "language, precedent, and practice" for judges to properly implement
those principles through constitutional interpretation. See Dworkin, supra note 280, at
11.
315. See Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 395-405 (1995); Richard A. Posner,
Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1998).
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of those in the legal system will determine whether his proposal
becomes practice.316 Until then, the burden of persuasion rests on the
commentator, and failure to follow a given approach is neither
illegitimate nor unjustified.317
Third, we could bring resort to extra-constitutional principles within
the overt practice of constitutional interpretation.1 8 If this type of
reasoning is part of constitutional analysis, it already functions as an
accepted method; it is part of the practice of constitutional
interpretation. 319 By making resort to this method overt, we open it to
critique and encourage decision-makers to discuss that basis for their
decision. Conversely, if resort to ideology is viewed as outside
constitutional practice, it takes on the air of the forbidden, and those
who admit to its practice are stigmatized and chastised as illegitimate.
Of course, the practice will still go on because it is inevitable. It will
simply go on undercover, unacknowledged.
Professor Philip Bobbitt comes closest to providing an overt role for
ideology,32° urging the decision-maker to consult her "conscience."321
When the methods conflict or are unclear, decision-makers must still
make decisions-that is the function of constitutional interpretation.322
When the methods run out, individual conscience fills the gap: "[t]he
space for moral reflection on our ideologies is created by the conflict
among [methods], just as garden walls can create a space for a
garden. ''323  The decision-maker self-consciously reflects on her
"values" and renders the decision most consistent with those values.324
316. Professor Pierre Schlag makes the further point that normative legal theorists
are often so removed from real legal work that they have little influence on that work:
"[N]ormative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even
though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do
it.... When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should
become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates?"
Schlag, supra note 1, at 178-79.
317. See Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth 137 (1996) (discussing legitimacy and
justification in law).
318. See Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 270,
303-07 (1993) (arguing that resort to ideology is not currently part of our
constitutional practice).
319. Cf. Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court in a Postmodern World: A
Flying Elephant, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 673, 692 (2000) ("Postmodernists often turn toward
their own social practices and make the cultural and theoretical awareness of those
practices part of the practices themselves.").
320. Bobbitt, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 141-86 (identifying and defending role
for individual "conscience" in constitutional interpretation).
321. Id. at 178-86.
322. Id. at 39 ("Decisions are sought, decisions are required, when their
consequences have legal effect, that is, an effect that calls forth actions of the state
that must be rationalized in accordance with the decision.").
323. Id. at 177; see id. at 168 ("The United States Constitution formalizes a role for
the conscience of the individual sensibility by requiring decisions that rely on the
individual moral sensibility when the modalities of argument clash.").
324. Id. at 170 ("The US Constitution engages our moral sensibilities by the clash
of its interpretive modalities, which require the moral instance of our judgment.").
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In doing so, the decision-maker must not adopt a meta-theory to
constrain or discipline conscience, for our conscience and moral
judgments are neither static nor susceptible to rigorous and systematic
definition.325  We must be "constantly" open to "self-conscious
examination" of how conscience shapes our decisions, 6 and the need
to decide constitutional questions supplies an unending stream of
opportunities to do so.
Making resort to ideology a constitutional method is easier said
than done. Recall that the constitutional methods are not normative,
but rather reflect our practices in arguing and deciding constitutional
issues. In current practice, ideology acts sub silentio in constitutional
decision-making. Decision-makers either consciously manipulate the
methods to hide ideology, or are not conscious of ideology's effect on
their decision. Consequently, we have no discernable practice for
expressing and critiquing the use of ideology in constitutional
argument. If ideology is to function overtly as a constitutional
method, we must develop a practice for doing so.
An overt practice of ideology is unlikely to evolve in the current
constitutional climate. Consider the near compulsive drive of some
constitutional commentators to rid constitutional law of individual
ideology, if not individual discretion. Similarly, politicians fuel the fire
with their sloganeering for judges who, "interpret the law, not make
it," as if that shibboleth had real meaning. And, charges of
"legislating from the bench" or "reading personal preferences into the
Constitution" have become standard judicial put-downs. No wonder
we have no vocabulary for speaking about ideology's role in
constitutional interpretation. 27
Then again, maybe we have such a vocabulary without even
knowing it. Constitutional arguments, whether by judges, legislators,
or other government officials, or by litigants, law professors, or other
commentators, are routinely critiqued by other constitutional
practitioners. This critique often "exposes" how someone's
constitutional argument is not supported by the methods, but rather
rests on hidden assumptions, has internal inconsistencies, or the like.
For example, a litigant's brief will do so to the opposing party's
arguments. Or, a dissenting judge will do so to her court's majority
opinion, and vice versa. Or, the President will do so in response to
congressional action, or vice versa. Or, a law professor will do so to
the constitutional arguments of any of the above actors, as well as to
325. Id. at 168, 173-74.
326. I. at 184-85.
327. See id. at 184 ("This particular sort of recollection [to ideology] is the very
thing that the current commentary on constitutional decisionmaking seeks to dispense
with by insisting on the illegitimacy of our practices and the need for a particular
decision process."); Patterson, supra note 317, at 303-07 (noting absence of a
descriptive account of the use of ideology in constitutional decision-making).
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the arguments of other professors. In each instance, the critic claims
to expose how a specific argument relies on something outside the
methods of argument, what we have called personal ideology. The
critic's conclusion is that the argument is fatally flawed because of its
resort to ideology.
The practice of constitutional critique, then, shows constitutional
practitioners ferreting out resort to ideology in constitutional
argument. But, our practice ends there. It is like a pig foraging for
truffles, only to discard the prize once found. Like the gourmet chef,
we must figure out how to incorporate these savory morsels into our
repertoire, not discard them as if toxic waste.
Perhaps the only way to change our practices is to continually show
how ideology plays an inevitable role in constitutional decision-
making. To do so, a wide diversity of perspectives could be brought to
bear on the important task of constitutional critique and
commentary.3z Only by repeated examination and critique from
different viewpoints can we gradually reveal the manipulation of
method or the unexamined influence of ideology.3 9 An author
writing from an "outsider" perspective may identify a hidden
assumption or bias missed by mainstream legal academics.330  For
example, "an African-American constitutional scholar might
recognize more readily than a white scholar that the Constitution is a
tool of both oppression and liberation: the Constitution appeared to
legitimate slavery and Jim Crow laws as legal institutions, yet
supported the Civil Rights Movement and desegregation. ' 33'
Repeated critique, sustained over a long time, may slowly reveal the
role of ideology and help change the climate toward its role.332
328. See Feldman, supra note 319, at 684-86 (including members of once-excluded
groups in the legal academy yielded scholarship that offered alternate accounts of
legal events).
329. Id. at 689. Feldman explains that:
As previously excluded or subjugated outgroups and minorities began to
voice their rights and claims, the idea that a natural or neutral baseline or
foundation truly existed began to look like a myth.... [T]hose baselines
represented no more than the cultural preferences of a dominant majority in
American society. From this vantage, competing normative claims in
constitutional law began to represent no more than different cultural
perspectives comprised of different voices and different truths.
Id.
330. See id. at 684-88; Feldman, supra note 299, at 180 ("[I]f there are postmodern
paths to justice, they lie in the deconstructive disclosure of the ever-present tacit
assumptions and cultural values that always hide or marginalize some metaphorical
Other-an oppressed and subjugated subcultural group.").
331. Feldman, supra note 319, at 686.
332. The goal of such critique is not to ultimately reveal some neutral, object
position from which unbiased legal decision-making can proceed; no such position
exists. See Fish, supra note 211, at 439 (stating that "impartiality" is simply an activity
defined from an individual's partial position, "constitutive of and inseparable from
some partial view of the world" (emphasis in original)). Rather, such critique may
revise an individual's partial world view, yielding a different set of assumptions that
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Even if the climate does someday change, and constitutional
decision-makers acknowledge the role of ideology, we need not
develop an overt practice of resorting to ideology. Instead, we might
simply acknowledge that Type IV cases exist, and then go on with
constitutional law as before, as if we did not know any better.'3 In
this view, to openly acknowledge Type IV cases is to start us down a
postmodernist road that can only end in the inability of the legal
system to function. Once Type IV cases are exposed, it will not be
long before the methods themselves are exposed as merely culturally
contingent conventions. And, because these conventions are used to
divvy up things in society-wealth, power, status, etc.-many people
have a stake in which conventions are used.3-" Then, the conventions
themselves will be up for grabs, just another political football. 35 The
conventional understanding of legal reasoning will dissolve, and law
will appear just another form of politics. Finally, its form will match
its substance.3 6
To some in the legal academy, the preceding paragraph is de rigeur,
or even passe 337 But to most of those who work and live in our legal
system, such an acknowledgment would shatter that faith that holds
the system, and perhaps society, together: the rule of law, meaning
that something other than contingent personal preferences decide
legal outcomes.3m What would be the consequences of dispelling this
guide her action. Id This new set of assumptions will be no more neutral or objective
than the prior set, but it will be different in a way that accommodates others, perhaps
yielding greater consensus on legal decisions.
333. This approach has been called an ironic use of constitutional method. See
Feldman, supra note 319, at 677 ("[W]hereas modernist scholars use the] tools [of
legal reasoning] earnestly, postmodernist scholars use them ironically, knowing that
the tools cannot perform as promised."). If we know that the methods do not decide
Type IV cases, but still act as if they do, our analysis proceeds with an ironic, knowing
wink to the reader. Id at 697-98 (observing that some justices wink at the reader by
using unconventional arguments in their opinions).
334. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Persistence of Power and fie Struggle for
Dialogic Standards in Postmodern Constitutional Jurisprdence: Michelman,
Habermas, and Civic Republicanism, 81 Geo. L.J. 2243, 2258-66 (1993); cf Pierre
Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. Pa. L Rev. 801, 803-04, 860-61
(1991) (discussing legal practice as "a complex network of bureaucratic power").
335. Schlag, supra note 1, at 184 ("Once legal thinkers understand that the
significance of the normative categories and the normative grammar is largely
performative, they assume a new stance towards normative rhetoric. They see it as an
instrumental vehicle for achieving their favorite political or moral ends.").
336. See id at 183-87.
337. See Feldman, supra note 319, at 686; Schlag, supra note 1, at 186 ("[Mly sense
is that the disenchantment of normative legal thought is already well on its way.");
Pierre Schlag, Law as the Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 Cal. L Rev. 427,
440 (1997) ("[O]nce you say that God is just a bunch of conventions, he loses a great
deal of his appeal. Correspondingly, worship comes to lack a certain seriousness. The
same goes for law.").
338. See Schlag, supra note 1, at 182 ("(It is one of the vexations of our condition
in the legal academy, as elsewhere, that various kinds of thought remain socially and
institutionally operative (in fact dominant) long after their intellectual vitality has
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belief? Consider this warning from Justice John Marshall Harlan:
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is
more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of
rules defining various rights and duties of its members, enabling
them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences
in an orderly, predictable manner. Without such a "legal system,"
social organization and cohesion are virtually impossible.... Put
more succinctly, it is this injection of the rule of law that allows
society to reap the benefits of rejecting what political theorists call
the "state of nature.3 39
Judges, lawyers, litigants, and others in the system act as if the rule of
law has meaning. If their faith is shattered, how will they act? If the
conventions of legal reasoning are cast aside as an illusion, how will
judges decide cases? If the mass of Americans goes from believing
that legal decisions reflect the law, to believing that the law is no more
than the preferences of an elite few, how will that change society? Is
the rule of law a form of secular religion that serves as the opiate of
the American masses?
While the preceding paragraph has the tone of a Chicken Little
rant, it underscores a very real point about academic commentary.
Many postmodern legal commentators tear down the edifice of
current legal practices but offer no practical alternative. The fact is
that the day after postmodern enlightenment is achieved,- the world
will continue turning on its axis, and judges will still have to decide
cases, lawyers will still have to advise clients, and regulators will still
have to administer the law. But, how should they do so?
Perhaps the best we can do is muddle through. Like the
postmodernist, we can use the constitutional methods ironically.
Though we know those methods cannot support a strong conception
of the rule of law, they are all we have,"4 and they do constrain
discretion. Further, because we do know better, we remain open to
voices that reveal biased and inconsistent use of the methods.42 In
sum, we do the best we can with what we have.43
dissipated.").
339. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,374 (1971).
340. 1 realize the irony in the phrase "postmodern enlightenment."
341. See Minda, supra note 223, at 333 n.12 ("Postmodernists... would be the first
to concede that the vocabulary, grammar, and worldview of modernity remains
pervasive and continues to shape the thinking of people generally," and "that the
vocabulary and grammar of modernism are the only vocabulary and grammar
available."); Schlag, supra note 1, at 174 n.18 ("[Tlhe problem for postmodernists...
is that while the normative vocabulary and grammar are no longer an acceptable
currency for intellectuals to use in advancing claims for human beings, there is no
other vocabulary, no other grammar, as of yet."). Indeed, as Professor Bobbitt has
argued, while the methods cannot determine a single, correct answer to many
constitutional questions, they nonetheless legitimate constitutional interpretation andjustify its practice. See Bobbitt, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 171-77.
342. But our openness and skepticism are themselves partial, defined by our
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current beliefs and assumptions about the world. See Fish, supra note 211, at 440
("Skepticism is not a state, but an activity, something one performs, and one can
perform it only within-and not outside of-the already structured field that is
consciousness; it is a part of that field, and therefore is a mistake to think that
skepticism (or critical self-reflection or critique or self-awareness or provisionality or
a healthy tentativeness or anything else in that line) has an independence of other
(equally field-specific) operations such that it can act as a check on them.").
343. Professor Pierre Schlag has expressed a similar sentiment:
Should we call this game off? Frankly, it's not our call. And it's likely that,
for some time, judges will continue to play this game. They have to decide
cases, and it is understandable that they should strive to ascribe their legal
interpretations to something they call law. And it is even understandable
that in this endeavor they should try to fake it (and even fake it to
themselves). What is more, given the reflexive nature of the game, it's not
even clear that they are faking it.
Schlag, supra note 236, at 389.
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